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RISK-SHIFTING WITHIN A
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE
INCOHERENCE OF THE U.S.
TAX REGIME
DIANE M. RING*
INTRODUCTION
As multinational corporations play a growing role in the global
economy, sensible taxation of their cross-border transactions becomes
increasingly important. However, U.S. taxation of risk-shifting within a
single multinational corporation produces arbitrary results that are at
odds with the underlying economic relationships. For example, a U.S.
corporation with debt payable in a foreign currency might hedge its
exchange rate risk through a currency swap with a foreign branch,
which in turn could hedge the risk with a foreign third party.' Through
these transactions, the U.S. corporation would successfully eliminate
its currency risk and the transactions would net to zero. But despite
the net zero economic impact of the debt and hedging, the transac-
tions would have an important and often unpredictable effect on the
corporation's U.S. tax liability.
This effect arises because the U.S. corporation's two third-party
positions will have a different "source" for tax purposes, which in turn
will affect the amount of foreign taxes that can be used to reduce U.S.
*Assistant Professor 4]1 Law, Harvard Law School. I on grateful for comments from Relive])
Avi-Yonah, Charles 'F. Planiheck, H, David Rosenbloom, Reed Shuldiner, Jeff Strnad, Alvin War-
ren, and the participants in the Harvard Law School Seminar on Current Tax Research. I would
also like to thank Karen Johnson Shimp and Laurance Warco fb• their valuable research assis-
tance.
L In a classic currency swap (which operates differently from an interest tate swap in that
there is an exchange of principal at the beginning and end of the currency swap), Party A pays
Party B X units of one currency, such as yen, in exchange for Y units of another currency, such
as francs, on day one, During the period of the currency swap, Party A makes interim payments
equal to a specified interest rate (fixed or floating) on Y units of francs, and Party B makes interim
payments equal to a specified interest rate (fixed or floating) on X units of yen. At the end of
the swap, the parties re-exchange the principal autumns. Currency swaps have generally been
motivated by the observation that parties may have differing abilities to borrow in particular
markets. The idea is to have each party borrow in its best (most advantageous) market and then
find a swap partner who has borrowed in the currency sought. See generally JOHN C. HULL,
OPTIONS, FUTURES AND OTHER SECURITIES 123-28 (1993).
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tax liability. The foreign currency gain (or loss) on the U.S. corpora-
tion's debt will be U.S. source,' but the foreign currency loss (or gain)
on the foreign branch's third-party swap will be foreign source.5 These
will be the only two contracts recognized because the United States
does not recognize a contract made by a U.S. company with its own
foreign branch.'
The source of a U.S. corporation's income is critical in determin-
ing the amount of foreign tax credits that may be used to reduce U.S.
income tax owed. The larger the portion of a taxpayer's income that
is foreign source, the larger the amount of foreign tax credits that
might be used. Thus, if the corporation's U.S. source income is in-
creased (due to a foreign currency gain on the third-party debt) and
foreign source income is correspondingly decreased (due to a parallel
foreign currency loss on the foreign branch's third-party swap), then
the taxpayer faces the possibility that it can use fewer foreign tax credits
than it could in the absence of this economically net zero transaction.
The reason is that the "foreign loss" reduces foreign source income,
which otherwise might have carried additional foreign tax credits.
Alternatively, if U.S. source income is decreased (due to a loss on the
third-party debt) and foreign source income is increased (due to a gain
on the branch's third-party swap), then this net zero transaction might
enable the taxpayer to use more foreign tax credits than otherwise
possible.
In either case, the amount of foreign tax credits that the taxpayer
can use (and ultimately the tax owed to the United States) depends
on a transaction which has no economic effect. 5 Whether the taxpayer
2 See I.R.C. § 988(a)(3) (A) (1996) (foreign currency gain or loss is sourced to the residence
of the taxpayer or its relevant qualified business unit); I.R.C. § 988(c) (1) (B) (foreign currency
transactions covered by the residence source rule include debt instruments and financial instru-
ments).
3 See	 § 988(a) (3) (A); LR.C. § 988(c) (1) (B).
" See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i) (1994) (stating, in part, that lain agreement
between a taxpayer and a qualified business unit ... is not a notional principal contract because
a taxpayer cannot enter into a contract with itself.")
5
 Because the tax problem created for U.S. companies engaging in interbranch transactions
with their foreign branches turns on the use of foreign tax credits, the immediate severity of the
problem depends on the taxpayer's foreign tax credit situation. If the taxpayer has excess
limitation (i.e., sufficient foreign source income to use any available credits), an increase in
foreign source income may not be significant. A decrease in foreign source income, however,
might be harmful if the remaining foreign source income were no longer sufficient to use up
the available foreign tax credits. If the taxpayer has excess credits, increasing or decreasing
foreign source income might change the amount of foreign tax credits the taxpayer can use,
depending on whether the credits and income relate to the same basket. See I.R.C. §§ 901 (a),
904(d) (1996). Even if the current year impact on the use of foreign tax credits does not seem
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or the U.S. fisc will be the winner or loser in any particular case is not
predictable.6
 Nonetheless, such a result should be unappealing to a tax
system that is designed to accurately reflect the income of each tax-
payer and that seeks to prevent taxes from being impacted by transac-
tions that produce no net non-tax effect. Moreover, this result, which
occurs in various cases of risk-shifting within a corporation, is both
arbitrary and inconsistent with the U.S. tax treatment of risk-shifting
within a multinational group of related corporations.'
This drastic divergence between economic substance and taxation
derives from the U.S. tax treatment of internal risk-shifting. Unlike
other major industrialized nations, the United States does not recog-
nize risk-shifting within a multinational corporation, on the conceptual
grounds that a party cannot contract with itself. 8
 Recognition of the
interbranch contract between the home office and the foreign branch
would result in four (instead of two) transaction legs to consider: (1)
the home office's foreign currency debt, (2) the home office's position
in the interbranch swap, (3) the foreign branch's position in the
interbranch swap, and (4) the foreign branch's position in the third-
party swap. If the interbranch swap were recognized for tax purposes,
then the home office's gain (or loss) on its third-party debt would be
U.S. source and would be offset by the home office's U.S. source loss
(or gain) on the interbranch contract. Correspondingly, the branch's
gain (or loss) on the interbranch contract and loss (or gain) on its
third-party contract would both be foreign source and would offset
each other. 9 Recognition of the interbranch contract produces a tax
result consistent with the underlying economic activity; a net zero
transaction should not change a corporation's tax treatment and, with
recognition of the interbranch contract, it does not.
sign Meant for the above reasons, the impact may nevertheless be felt in prior or future tax years
due to the credit carryover mechanism. See I.R.C. § 904(c); infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
II There is no reason to believe that taxpayers have a special ability to accurately predict the
movement of currency exchange rates, interest rates, or stock or commodity prices, Assuming
efficient capital markets as a backdrop, the key is arm's length pricing of third party and related
party contracts. See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
7
 See generally 1JJ. BURGERS, TAXATION AND SUPERVISION OF BRANCHES OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BANKS AND OTHER ENTERPRISES (1991); Fred B, Brown, Federal
Income Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign. Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAx
L. Rxv. 133 (1993); Yaron Z. Reich, U.S. Federal Income Taxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks:
Selected Issues and Perspectives, 2 FLA. TAX REV, 1 (1994); Leslie B. Samuels & Patricia A. Brown,
Observations on the Taxation of Gbdtal Securities Trading, 45 TAX L. REV. 527 (1990).
8 See supra note 4.
• See I.R.C. .1i; 988(a) (3) (A) (1996).
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This paper examines why U.S. taxation of risk-shifting within a
single multinational corporation often creates a tax effect even though
the transactions have no net economic impact and considers how tax
rules can be developed that are more consistent with the taxpayer's
economic activities. The depth of both the problem and the possible
answers regarding the taxation of risk-shifting within a corporation can
be better understood through a comparison with the more flexible tax
treatment accorded risk-shifting within a multinational group of re-
lated corporations. The U.S. stance on risk-shifting within a single
corporation is motivated by concerns that are not unique to inter-
branch transactions but have been raised and addressed elsewhere.
This observation suggests that steps can be taken to align U.S. taxation
with the economic reality of the financial contracts that increasingly
manage the cross-border risks of multinational corporations.
The analysis in this paper is divided into four parts. Part I explains
how corporations use financial instruments"' to shift risk and further
describes the arbitrary taxation of risk-shifting within a single corpora-
tion. Part II outlines the current tax treatment of three traditional
risk-shifting transactions within a group of related corporations. These
three scenarios form the basis of the comparative analysis of risk-shift-
ing transactions that follows. Part 111 compares the taxation of risk-shift-
ing within a single corporation (the branch cases) to the taxation of
risk-shifting within a group of related corporations. Based on the
comparison, Part HI identifies key tax policy concerns and evaluates
the conflict between the U.S. tax rules and those of other countries."
Finally, Part IV contemplates a series of proposals that would make the
U.S. taxation of risk-shifting within the multinational corporation more
coherent.
I. THE PROBLEM: TAXATION OF RISK-SHIFTING CONTRACTS
WITHIN A CORPORATION
The availability of sophisticated risk analysis and risk management
tools12 has enabled many businesses to monitor and modify their risk
In I will use the term financial instrument broadly, but I generally have in mind derivative
financial instruments—those contracts, such as forwards, swaps and options, whose value depends
on the price or rate movement of some underlying asset or index.
11 This analysis involving financial instruments is pursued against the backdrop of the existing
inconsistencies in the taxation of such instruments (e.g., the debt/equity distinction).
12 Various statistics indicate the volume of derivatives business and its growth over time. For
example, the worldwide volume of notional principal amount of derivatives outstanding as of the
end of 1992 was $12.1 trillion. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED 'I'0
PROTECI"I'LlE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, GAO/GGD-94-133 (May 1994) (citing Eli M. Retnolona, The
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profiles through strategies of risk-shifting and hedging." Businesses
increasingly rely on financial instruments to centralize and manage
risk" in a cost-effective manner." For a multinational corporation, this
risk-shifting often may entail financial contracts within the corporation
(interbranch contracts). For a group of related corporations, risk-shift-
ing frequently is achieved through financial contracts between mem-
bers of the group. Such contracts shift the risk from one member to
another member of the group that can manage the risk more effec-
tively—for example, by centralizing the group's risk of that type and
hedging the net risk with a third party) An alternative risk-shifting
strategy for a group of related corporations does not involve a financial
contract between members. Instead, one member enters into a hedge
with a third party on behalf of another member (risk pooling).
The U.S. tax rules governing risk-shifting contracts generally do
not display the same flexibility as the business transactions themselves.
In some cases, a group of related corporations that pool risks as if they
were a single entity are taxed in accordance with the underlying eco-
nomic relationships.''' Moreover, if the group chooses to use risk-shift-
ing contracts between its members, the contracts are recognized in
accordance with their economic role.' 8 Rarely, however, does the tax
system recognize contractual risk-shifting within a single corporation
(e.g., a contract between the home office and foreign branch of a
Recent Growth of Financial Derivative Markets, FED. RESERVE BANK Or N.Y. Q. REV. (New York:
Winter 1992-93)). At the end of 1994, companies in Standard & Poor's 500 Index held derivatives
totaling $19 trillion. See Study: S&P 5001s Firms Held $19 Trillion of Derivatives in '94, TIIE HOUS.
CIIRON., May 11,1996, Bus. at 3. Trade in over - the-counter derivatives exceeded $17 trillion in
1995. See Stephen Coplan, Capital Briefs: OTC Derivatives Traded up Nearly 60% in '95, Am.
BANKER, jilly 11,1996, at 2 (citing the International Swaps and Derivatives Association).
15 See, e.g., Patti K. Brooks, Derivative Activities: Expanding Compliance Implications for the
Bank Regulatory Manager 17 A.B.A. BANK COMPLIANCE 27 (May/June 1986) ("derivatives have
become a key element in asset/liability and other financial risk management strategies of virtually
all types of organizations"); Robert Brooks, Derivative's Beyond the Rhetoric, 42 Risx MGT. 37 (July
1995) (noting that "derivatives can help an organization clarity its risk exposures").
14 The scenarios under consideration here assume that the taxpayer is engaged in financial
management as opposed to pure risk taking or speculating with respect to the financial instru-
ments.
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7, at 167-68; Charles T. Plambeek, The lax Implications of Global
Trading, 48 TAX NOTES 1143 (Aug. 27, 1990) [hereinafter Plambeck, taxation of Global Tradingl;
Reich, supra note 7, at 16-17; Letter from Lawrence R. Uhlick, International Bankers Present
Position Paper on Cross -Border Interbranch Trading, TAX CORRESPONDENCE, HiGuLicarrs AND
DocumENTs 51,53 (Oct. 1, 1993).
36
 Even in a consolidated group, related party risk-shifting can he useful. The related party
transactions may be important in centralizing the risk management function, as explained in the
examples that follow. See infra note 141 and text accompanying notes 141-42.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 150-57.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 150,158-59.
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corporation),Ig despite actual and significant risk-shifting between the
branches, and despite the fact that the branches may be treated inde-
pendently for other legal purposes." The tax law relies heavily on a
party's legal status as a separate entity to identify the taxpayers and the
relevant transactions. 21
 To the extent the tax law is currently willing to
look beyond legal status, it is usually in one direction only—toward
grouping legally separate entities together and treating them as one.
The question of transactions within a single corporation and within
a group of related corporations is not unique to the use of financial
instruments, but pervades much of the tax law, from transfer pricing
to theories underlying the consolidated return provisions. 22
 The focus
here, however, is limited to financial contracts and risk-shifting. The
flexibility of financial instruments, their role in sophisticated financial
management, and the fact that financial entities frequently operate
internationally in branch form raise the stakes for the tax analysis of
internal risk-shifting through financial contracts. Moreover, the rise of
global trading has exacerbated the tension between tax law and busi-
ness practice by increasing the cross-border business of banks and
financial services entities which often use two or more branches in a
transaction. 23
 Ultimately, though, ideas developed in the context of
10 Although interbranch transactions are not generally recognized, an Advanced Pricing
Agreement involving allocations from interbranch transactions was completed tinder the author-
ity of a treaty. See First APA Covering Gross
-Border, Interbranch Bank Transactions Concluded, 64
BANKING REP. (BNA) 524, 524-25 (Mar. 13, 1995).
2° See, e.g., I.R.C. § 884 (1996) (branch profits tax imposes a 30% tax on dividend equivalent
amounts "deemed" paid by the U.S. branch of a foreign corporation to its home office); Treas.
Reg. § 1.988-1(a) (10) (ii) (1992) (recognizing interbranch foreign currency transactions under
certain circumstances).
According to federal hank regulators, each bank branch must keep detailed records of the
amounts due from and due to other branches or the home office. These records are subject to
audit, and appear on various reports filed with the regulators by the branches. U.S. banks or
branches with foreign affiliates must report their overseas obligations on a net due to/due from
basis and must also file quarterly reports detailing their overseas exposure. Each branch is
required to keep separate records supporting these figures. Thus, although the bank ultimately
files consolidated records, each branch is treated separately for purposes of determining the
amounts due to and from each other branch. (Based on 1996 conversation with an Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency official describing the general policy and approach for bank
branches); see also PAM. S. PILECKI rr Ar., 9 BANKING L. 191.05 at 191-77, 191-79, 191-80 (1996)
(discussing the scope of the authority of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
regarding the examination of foreign bank branches, the obligation of the foreign bank branch
to demonstrate that the head office can effectively monitor the "real performance and risks of
the branch", and the Board's examination of the branch's stock of assets).
21
 For example, incorporation as a separate legal entity under state or local law. David
Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. REV. 731, 739-41 (1995).
22 See generally I.R.C. regulations under §§ 482, 1502 (1996).
23 See, e.g., San-kiwis & Brown, supra note 7, at 529-30, 537 (first describing the developments
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contractual risk-shifting may provide guidance for tax rules in other
areas as well.
The first step, however, is to identify the problems: namely, the
cases in which the taxation of risk-shifting fails to "accurately" or appro-
priately reflect the underlying activity. This requires understanding the
use of financial instruments in risk-shifting. 24 Although the purpose of
this paper is to think more comprehensively about the taxation of
risk-shifting within a single corporation, it is necessary to begin with a
discussion of specific examples and their current tax treatment in
order to lay the foundation for the more conceptual analysis that
follows.
Implicit in any claim that current law improperly taxes risk-shifting
(to the taxpayer's detriment) is the view that the transactions involve
valid business activities that should not be discouraged by the tax
system, but instead should be taxed in accordance with the underlying
economic transactions to minimize the impact of tax law on business
behavior. With this in mind, the descriptions of the cases identify the
business significance of the transactions.
A. How Financial Instruments Are Used to Shift Risk
This discussion serves as the baseline for the more complicated
fact patterns that follow. The financial instrument used is a swap, either
interest rate or currency. It was selected because it provides a clear
example of a financial instrument used as a hedging transaction. Al-
though the specific tax rules applicable to other financial instruments
are different, their tax significance in this inquiry is the same.
that contributed to the growth of global securities trading and then explaining that the branch
form is a common business structure for banking entities).
24 The focus in this paper on financial instruments' central role in risk management differs
from most literature on financial instruments, which tend to highlight their abuse potential. For
example, the instruments often facilitate financial engineering that enables taxpayers to manipu-
late inconsistent tax rules. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Commentary - Financial Contract Innova-
tion and Income lax Polity, 107 lime'. L. REV. 460, 491-92 (1993). A classic example was the tax
rate arbitrage between periodic coupon bonds and zero coupon bonds prior to the enactment
of effective original discount rules. See Bradford, supra note 21, at 739-741. Through such
financial strategies, taxpayers can maximize their net after-tax position without affecting the
underlying economic results. See, e.g„ Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the 'Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 71 Thx, L. Rio/. 243, 335 (1992);.jeffStrnad, 'Axing New Financial Products:
A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L Rev. 569, 573 (1994).
Although financial instruments arc not the only transactions creating tension in the tax
system, their inherent flexibility and their capacity to isolate and subdivide cash flows and facilitate
risk-shifting magnifies their role. Thus, on the subject of financial instruments, the U.S. Ilse
generally is perceived to be the systematic loser. As a result, ITIOSI tax analyses involving financial
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1. Basic Financial Contract 25
Taxpayer (a U.S. corporation) and a domestic third party enter
into an interest rate swap 26 (fixed rate of eleven percent for floating
LIBOR27
 on a notional principal amount of four million dollars for five
years). 28
 The net periodic swap payments must be accrued currently. 29
Although there is no current guidance on the character of the periodic
swap payments, commentators generally have assumed that in the case
of an interest rate swap, the periodic payments are ordinary in nature.'
The source of any gain or loss to Taxpayer on the swap will be
U.S. source. Residence-based source rules traditionally have applied to
payments under forwards, futures, and options contracts. 31 These rules,
instruments principally concentrate on identifying and remedying the inconsistencies that permit
taxpayer abuse, including the timing and character treatment of transactions. See, e.g., Bradford,
supra, note 21; Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah EL Schenk, Taxation Withoat Realization: A
"Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. Ray. 725, 726 (1992); Mark P. Gergen, The
Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading Under Realization, Expected Return and Retrospective
Taxation, 49 TAX L. Raw. 209, 218 (1994).
25 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1234 (1996) (taxation of options); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3 (1994) (taxation
of notional principal contracts).
21 ' For a more detailed description of swap transactions see, for example, S. HENDERSON & J.
PRICE, CURRENCY ANI) INTEREST RATE SWAPS (1988); ANDREA S. KRAMER, FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
TAXATION, REGULATION, AND DESIGN 60.2, 1424-53 (1991).
27 LIBOR is the London Interbank Offered Rate, the interest rate large international banks
dealing in Eurodollars charge each other on short term loans.
25
 Thus, wider the contract, Taxpayer agrees to pay annual amounts equal to 11% of $4
million in exchange for annual payments equal to the current floating rate of LIBOR on $4
million. Generally, Taxpayer and the counter-party will net their periodic payments so that only
one actual payment will he made.
29 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(e) (2), (3). Regulations under I.R.C. § 446 provide very specific
timing rules for a variety of notional principal contracts including caps, floors, collars, and swaps.
These rules govern all taxpayers regardless of their regular method of accounting (e.g., cash or
accrual). Special rules apply to dealers in financial instruments. See I.R.C. § 475 (1996). To the
extent a dealer holds securities (defined to include notional principal contracts), any securities
that constitute inventory must be included in inventory at Iltir market value. See id. § 475(0(1).
Any securities not considered inventory must be marked-to-market at year end. See id.
§ 475(a) (2). Other rules apply in the case of certain hedging transactions. See id. § 475(b) (1).
If the parties exchange swap premium or other non-periodic payments, the parties mast
recognize the payment over the life of the swap. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(0 (2).
s41' See KRAMER, supra note 26, at 60.2(b)(i), 1428-29 (1991 & 1994 Supp.); Edward 1).
Klein bard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System,
69 TEX. L. Ray. 1319, 1347 (1991); Edward D. Kleinbard & Suzanne F. Greenburg, Business Hedges
After Arkansas Best, 43 TAX L. Ray. 393, 426 (1988); Erika W, Nijenhuis, Taxation of Notional
Principal Contracts, in TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 3:38 (Reuven Avi-Yonah et al. eds.,
1996); Christopher Dean Olander & Cynthia L. Spell, Interest Rate Swaps: Status Under Federal
'Mx and Securities Law, 45 MD. L. REV. 21, 41-42 (1986); Note, Tax-Exempt Entities, Notional
Principal Contracts, and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 105 HARV. L. Ray. 1265, 1275-76
(1992).
51 See I.R.C. § 865(a), (j) (2) (1996).
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which source gain or loss to the residence of the taxpayer, have been
extended by regulation to cover other financial contracts, including
swaps."' In this example, Taxpayer is a U.S. corporation, thus any gain
on the swap is U.S. source. Taxpayer's swap expense (e.g., any net
periodic payment made by Taxpayer under the contract) is allocable
to the class of swap income and therefore, in this case, is allocated to
U.S. source income."
2. Hedging Transaction
In a variation on the above example, the same taxpayer (U.S.
corporation) enters into the interest rate swap, not as a speculative
transaction, but instead as a hedge of a debt instrument. Thus, assum-
ing Taxpayer has a five year four million dollar debt instrument on
which it is obligated to make interest payments based on LIBOR, the
interest rate swap would eliminate the taxpayer's risk of interest rate
movement"' on this underlying debt. 35
Special hedge timing rules help prevent a tax mismatch between
the swap (hedge) and the debt by requiring that a taxpayer "reasonably
match" the timing of income, deduction, gain or loss from the hedge
with that of the item hedged.m Recently promulgated capital asset rules
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)(i) provides that the source of income front a notional principal
contract (a category of financial instruments), including an interest. rate swap, "shall fie deter-
mined by the residmice of the taxpayer under Section 988(a) (3) (B) (i)," which looks It) the tax
home of an individual itticl in the case of it corporation, partnership or trust, its status under
§ 7701 of 1.R.C. as iiireign or domestic. Under certain circumstances, the source of inctime from
a notional principal contract is determined based on the residence of the taxpayer's relevant
business twit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b) (2), (3) (1991).
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(e) cross references Treas. Reg. § 1.863-1(c) for determination or
taxable foreign and U.S. net income. The killer regulation prescribes treatment paralleling the
allocation and apportionment of expenses and deductions to classes of gross income tinder Treas.
Reg. § 1.861-8. In some cases, however, financial products that "alter the effective cost of bar-
rowing" are treated as interest equivalents and their gains and losses are subject to special rules.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b) (6) (1996).
54 The risk dim LIBOR will change is removed because Taxpayer receives LIBOR-based
payments under the swap and uses them to satisfy its obligation to make LIBOR-based payments
under the debt. instrument.. Taxpayer is left making a fixed rate payment to the swap party, which
is not affected by movements in interest rates.
35
 Taxpayer, however, would not have eliminated all risk in the transaction. The risk of interest
rate movement would be replaced with credit risk of die swap counter-party.
56 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(b) (1996). For example, if an item and its hedge are disposed
of in the same taxable year, "taking realized gain or loss into account on both hems in that taxable
year may clearly reflect income." Id. Where the hedged item is is debt instrument, gain or loss
from the hedge "must be accounted for by reference to the terms of the debt instrument and
the period or periods to which the hedge rel•tes." Id. !:j 1.446-4 (c) (4). Thus, for example, a hedge
of a debt that provides for interest to be paid at a fixed rate is generally accounted fin' using
constant yield principles. Id.
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clarify the character treatment of a hedging transaction." An interest
rate swap that is part of a qualified hedging transaction is not consid-
ered a capital asset, so it receives ordinary character treatment."
In this case, Taxpayer's swap cash flow functions as a cost of
capital (i.e., as an "interest equivalent"), therefore special rules govern
source)'' Interest equivalents, which are expenses or losses incurred in
transactions relating to the time value of money or hedging debt, must
be allocated and apportioned in the same manner as interest.'" Interest
expense is allocated and apportioned across a taxpayer's domestic and
foreign assets because money is fungible and thus, interest is consid-
ered attributable to all of a taxpayer's assets and activities. 4 ' Any losses
that Taxpayer suffers on this swap 42 are allocated and apportioned,
along with actual interest expense, across its U.S. and foreign assets. 45
Gains on the interest rate swap are not covered by the interest
equivalent rules under I.R.C. §§ 861 and 864 and do not reduce inter-
est expense subject to allocation and apportionment. Instead, any gain
is sourced as it was in the prior example of a speculative transaction,
to the residence of the taxpayer." This regime results in a mismatch:
gains and losses from the swap that hedges the debt are not sourced
by the same rules. In this particular case, however, where the taxpayer
(the U.S. corporation) has no foreign assets, the result is the same: all
gains and losses on the hedge are sourced to the United States.
The tax rules recognize the potential problems from the sourcing
mismatch of gain and loss and provide the taxpayer with an opportu-
nity to unify the sourcing of gains and losses on certain financial
contracts that are interest equivalents.'" If a taxpayer uses a financial
37 See id. § 1.1221-2(a)(1) (1996) (stating that the term "capital asset does not include
property that is part of a hedging transaction"). Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2(0(2) provides that a
transaction not properly identified as a hedging transaction does not qualify as a hedge, and its
character is thus determined without reference to this section. To qualify, a hedge must be
properly identified on the date the taxpayer enters into the hedge transaction. This requirement
prevents the taxpayer from waiting to see if the transaction produces a gain or a kiss before
making the decision whether to identify as a hedge based on the particular tax treatment
desired—usually capital asset treatment for gains, ordinary treatment for losses.
"See id. § 1. I 221-2(a).
39 See id. § 1.861-91'(3)(1) (1996).
4(' See id.
41 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 864(e) (2) and the regulations thereunder, Treas. Reg. § 1.861-91'(b)
only applies to losses on interest equivalents.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 44-47 for a discussion on the treatment of a gain of
the swap.
43 See infra note 78.
44 See Treas. Reg. § .863-7(b) (1991).
45 Although the United States taxes the U.S. corporation on all of its income regardless of
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instrument (such as an interest rate swap, cap, option or forward) to
"alter the effective cost of borrowing, "46 and both the hedge and the
actual borrowing are in the same currency, any gains on the hedge
reduce interest expense subject to apportionment.47 As a result, Tax-
payer's gains, as well as losses, on the financial instrument (in this
example, the swap) are effectively apportioned.
B. Current Tax Treatment of Risk -Shifting Within a Single Corporation
Having illustrated the basic use and taxation of a swap, this section
first examines why businesses operate through branches and why they
engage in risk-shifting through interbranch contracts. Then, this sec-
tion describes the use of a swap for risk-shifting within a single corpo-
ration and outlines the problems with its taxation under current law.
1. Taxpayer Reasons for Internal Risk-Shifting Through
Interbranch Hedges
a. Why Operate Through a Branch?
A central premise of any discussion regarding the taxation of
risk-shifting within a corporation is that the taxpayer's foreign opera-
tion is a branch. This raises the question of why a corporation would
operate through a branch instead of through a subsidiary. Depending
on the taxpayer's business, significant non-tax reasons may motivate
the taxpayer's choice of the branch structure.
Banks frequently operate in foreign countries (i.e., not their place
of incorporation) through branches. 48 This is in contrast to many
other types of businesses, which typically operate in foreign countries
through subsidiaries." Regulators have observed that the preferred
where earned, source affects the use of foreign tax credits, and ultimately the total tax to be paid.
See supra text accompanying notes 4-5; infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
46 The U.S. corporation in the example is using the interest rate swap to "alter the effective
cost of borrowing." The corporation has a borrowing (the $4 million debt instrument) and it
enters into the swap to effectively change its cost of borrowing (i.e. the interest owed) from a
floating rate, LIBOR, to a fixed rate, 11%.
47 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b) (6) (1996). The special rule for gain on interest equivalent
hedges applies only if the taxpayer has satisfied the identification requirements specified and is
not a financial services entity. See id. § 1.861-9T(b) (6) (iv). Regulations applying these rules to
financial services entities have been reserved. Id. § 1.861-9T(b) (6) (v).
48 See, e.g., MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, 1 REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS 10.01,
10-2 to 10-3 (2d ed. 1995) ("Foreign banks historically have engaged in the banking business in
the United States through branches and agencies, rather than directly through subsidiaries
").
49 Operating through a subsidiary can offer a number of benefits, including limited liability.
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and usually most efficient manner of conducting international hank
business is through foreign branches." U.S. commercial banks and
bank holding companies have more foreign branches than subsidiaries
and they also have more of their foreign assets in branches than in
subsidiaries. 5 ' Similarly, branches account for most of the U.S. offices
of foreign banks. 52
One primary reason that banks operate through branches involves
the regulation of bank assets, capital structure and business activities."
For example, most countries limit a branch's ability to lend based on
the bank's worldwide capital, not on some level imputed from the
branch's size.5' Also, although a parent can guarantee the loans of its
subsidiaries, in practice, lenders frequently prefer to have direct access
to all of the creditor bank's assets. 55 Thus, despite the appeal of using
separate entities to benefit from limited liability, businesses, especially
banks, are drawn to the use of branches to facilitate efficient capital
deployment.
Certain tax problems arise, however, when banks structure their
foreign activities through branches. Most significantly, bank branches
frequently engage in intra-bank transactions on a cross-border basis—
that is, transactions between a bank home office or branch located in
"See JAMES V. HOUPT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED, RESERVE SYS. INTERNATIONAL.
TRENDS FOR U.S. BANKS AND BANKING MARKETS, STAFF STUDY, 2-4, 7,10 (1988). This study,
undertaken by the staff of the Board of Governors, was part of a broader effort by the staffs of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and of the Federal Reserve Banks to review
a range of economic and financial subjects. See id. at 2. The paper, however, is stated to represent
the view of the author and not necessarily agreement among the Board, the Banks or the staffs.
See id. at i; see also Banque Indosuez et al., Report on the Taxatim of Global Trading of Certain
Financial Instruments, reprinted in 9l TAX NOTES 22-19 (May 29, 1991) (noting that "banks
have traditionally utilized branch form to engage in international operations").
51 See HoupT , supra note 50, at 3 (Table 1, covering the period 1978-1987).
52 See id. at 25 (Table 17, covering the period 1978-1987). See also GEN. Accr. OFFICE,
FOREIGN BANKS - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF
1991, GAO/GGD-96-187 (Sept. 30,1996) [hereinafter GAO REP'T, FOREIGN BANKS] (noting that
"[b]ranches and agencies are the most common organizational forms—accounting for about 78
percent of foreign bank assets at the end of 1995," whereas "Ilfloreign-owned U.S. banks [sic]
subsidiaries held over 21 percent of fOreign bank assets.").
5:3 See, e.g., GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 48, at 10-2 (stating that "[t] he branch format, lin
example, may permit the most effective use of the foreign bank's capital."); PILECKI ET Al.., supra
note 20, at 191-10 (1996) (citing the report and study pi-minced by the Treasury Department
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System which concluded that foreign banks
operate more efficiently through branches).
M See, e.g., GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 48, at 10-2 ("Foreign banks require substantial
capital to establish a presence in the U.S. banking market. As a result, the U.S. branch may be
able to consider capital historically accumulated by home country and other foreign operations
so that it may not be subject to restrictive U.S. lending limitations.").
55 See HOUPT, supra note 50, at 2-3.
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one country and a branch located in another country." Interbranch
transactions include not only loans, but also hedging transactions nec-
essary for managing currency, interest rate and other risks. As noted
below, in some cases, such as foreign currency hedging, the branch
may be the best choice for hedging because it is one of the primary
dealers in the currency and can most effectively transfer the risk to
third parties. 57
b. Why Transact with a Branch?
The next question raised by the analysis of risk-shifting within
a single multinational corporation is why contract with the foreign
branch. If the home office has a third-party position it must hedge, the
foreign branch may be in the best position to execute the hedge. For
example, it may be operating in the primary market for that risk (e.g.,
the main market for that currency) and may have existing relations
and contracts with the local participants. Often, the branch may be a
dealer with respect to such contracts and may represent a cost effective
counter-party.
An interbranch contract, however, is not necessary to take advan-
tage of the foreign branch's special market position. The branch could
execute a third-party swap without entering into an interbranch trans-
action with the home office. Taxpayers, however, frequently do use
interbranch transactions. A primary business reason for the actual
interbranch contract is that the record of interbranch transactions
helps identify and measure the value provided to the corporation by
each separate branch/business unit. By entering into the interbranch
contract, as opposed to having the branch execute only the third-party
contract, the home office and branch can show their respective values
to the organization through a fair market value interbranch contract."
'6 See, e.g., GRUSON & RKISNER, supra note 45, at 10-9 (noting that a common structure for
banks engaging in financial instrument transactions and global trading involves each branch or
office hedging Its own position by entering into interbranch financial product transactions with
other offices,")
57 See infra Part I.B.I.b. Also, for example, reducing the number of third-party hedges
executed can reduce transaction costs. See infra note 141 for discussion of the use of related
party hedging transactions in the consolidated group context,
58 See, e.g., Robert A. Katcher & Jean A. Pawlow, Interbranek Banking Begs Create Burden, 'DIE
NAT'L 14 25 (June I, 1992). They note in a discussion of the management strategy of banks that:
the traditional tax rules apparently ignore the fact that the branches of a home-
office bank, like divisions in a large corporation, normally operate as independent
profit centers. A branch must show management how its operation contributes to
the overall profit of the bank, The branch's budget and salaries of its employees
often depend on a showing that the branch made a profit. Presumably, this acts as
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Tax law also provides a reason for actual transactions and their
recognition. As described in the examples that follow, recognition of
interbranch contracts (and thus the recognition of risk-shifting within
the corporation) reduces potential tax distortion. The use of actual
interbranch contracts facilitates the tax system's recognition and reli-
ance on the contracts. Many other countries 59 acknowledge the role of
contractual risk-shifting within a single multinational corporation, and
taxpayers that engage in the actual transactions may be taxed by such
countries in a manner more consistent with the underlying economic
activity.° Thus, the needs of business management and the desire for
more economic taxation lead taxpayers to shift risk internally and use
interbranch contracts.
2. Taxation of Risk-Shifting Within a Corporation Through
Interbranch Contracts
a. U.S. Coloration with Foreign Branch
The mere existence of a branch is not a tax problem. If the
financial contracts are entered into with a third party, the applicable
tax rules are those described above. Thus, if Taxpayer, a U.S. corpora-
tion with a foreign branch, enters into an interest rate swap with a third
party, the tax treatment would mirror that of the baseline U.S. corpo-
ration with no related parties. 6 ' Similarly, if Taxpayer enters into a
a check on interbranch interest charges, to ensure that the transactions will be at
market rates.
Id. Although the business incentives created by interbranch competition do not negate the need
for a statutory backup against pricing abuses, the incentives are helpful in understanding the
relationship of the parts of the entity. They also suggest that the entity's internal books may
accurately reflect each part's contribution.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 117-19,191-200.
60 As discussed infra text accompanying notes 85-102, the potential for very distortive tax
results is possible, particularly in the case of foreign corporations with U.S. branches. To the
extent that the impact of the current tax rules is negative and/or unpredictable (because it
depends on whether a particular contract position is a winner or loser) taxpayers may either bear
this burden, or not engage in the transaction at all, which may not be desirable from a monitoring,
regulatory, accounting or business efficiency perspective. See supra text accompanying notes
48-55.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 26-33. Note that if the swap is considered a contract
of a foreign branch that constitutes a "business unit," swap income might be sourced to the
residence of the branch (here, a foreign location) as opposed to the residence of the corporation
(i.e., its place of incorporation, here, the United States). See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(b)(2), (3)
(1991). In some cases, this can produce a split hedge (the hedge in one branch, the hedged item
in another), a situation related to the branch examples and the consolidated group hedging issue
discussed later.
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third-party interest rate swap to hedge its interest rate risk by convert-
ing its floating rate (LIBOR) debt to fixed rate debt, the tax treatment
would be the same as for the baseline U.S. corporation hedging with
a third party. Because the hedge would be an interest equivalent, any
losses on the swap would be subject to the allocation and apportion-
ment rules, as would swap gains, assuming the swap is qualified and
identified." Taxpayer in this case has at least some foreign assets (the
branch assets), so a portion of any swap expense would be allocated to
foreign source income."
If however, Taxpayer (more specifically, the home office) seeks to
hedge its floating rate debt by entering into a swap with its foreign
branch, which in turn hedges the risk with a local third party in the
branch's country, the analysis changes." U.S. tax law, as a general rule,
will not recognize contractual risk-shifting within a single corporation
because it does not acknowledge interbranch transactions.''' Financial
contracts do not exist between branches: an "agreement between a
taxpayer and a qualified business unit or among qualified business
units of the same taxpayer is not a notional principal contract [a
general category of financial contract] because a taxpayer cannot enter
into a contract with itself." 66
Economically, the taxpayer has hedged the interest rate risk, both
as separate business units (so that the home office and the branch
standing alone are hedged for the risk), and as an overall unit. For
tax purposes, however, only the home office's debt and the foreign
branch's third-party swap are recognized. The home office and the
branch positions in the interbranch swap are ignored. Nonetheless,
the taxpayer is hedged from a total taxable income perspective because
62 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b) (6) (1996); supra text accompanying notes 39-47.
63 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(g), (h).
iv' In am alter very common example, interbranch hedging would be used to shift foreign
currency risk as described in the example in the introduction. Often, a branch office may he the
best counter party. For example, if a branch office operates in the franc and the home office
operates in the dollar, then if the home office has any franc risk to shift, it may he most efficient
to accomplish that shift through the branch office if it is one of the major traders in the franc
or is better placed in the market than the home office.
65 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7(a) (1) (1991) (an agreement between a taxpayer and a
qualified business unit ("QBU") of the taxpayer is not a notional principal contract because a
taxpayer cannot enter into such a contract with itself). An exception that will he considered later
appears in the foreign currency regulations and in certain cases provides for recognition of
interbranch transactions. See id. § 1.988-2(a) (10) (ii) (1993).
66 Id. § 1.446-9(c) (1) (i) (1994) (defining a notional principal contract as a "financial instru-
ment that provides for the payment of amounts by one party to another at specified intervals
calculated by reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in exchange for
specified consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts").
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the United States taxes its domestic corporations on a worldwide ba-
sis.° Moreover, if the taxpayer identifies the positions in advance, the
timing and character treatment of the two "recognized" items will be
matched.`'" As a result, the entity's economic income of zero translates
into taxable income of zero, even though two of the four total trans-
action legs are not recognized. 69 Taxable income, however, is not the
end of the inquiry. The true bottom line is income tax paid to the
United States, which depends not only on taxable income but also on
the tax credits available to reduce the tax owed.
Although in terms of income and loss the interbranch hedging
transactions of a U.S. corporation may net to zero, a potentially sig-
nificant sourcing distortion can he created by the failure to recognize
the interbranch contract. The distortion may impact the actual amount
of tax paid to the United States by affecting the foreign tax credit
calculation. This issue underlays the problem case introduced at the
beginning of the paper regarding the taxation of risk-shifting between
a U.S. corporation's home office and its foreign branch through a
currency swap." Pursuant to the statutory formula limiting the avail-
ability of foreign tax credits, the larger the portion of a taxpayer's total
income that is foreign source, the larger the maximum amount of
foreign tax credits that can be used to reduce U.S. income tax.'' As a
result, U.S. taxpayers typically have strong incentives to classify more
of their income as foreign source, rather than domestic source, and,
correspondingly, to say that more of their deductions should be used
to reduce U.S. income, as opposed to foreign source income.
As described earlier, the U.S. tax treatment of risk-shifting within
a multinational corporation creates significant sourcing distortions for
a U.S. corporation hedging a currency risk with its foreign branch. 72
Because of the unique allocation rules applicable to interest expense,
however, the source distortion from not recognizing interbranch con-
tracts is minimized in the case of an interest rate hedge. In the present
example of the U.S. corporation entering into an interest rate swap
°That is, changes in LIBOR no longer directly impact taxpayer's taxable income line
(assuming these were the only transactions).
c's See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2 (e) (1996) .
65 The four legs are: (I) the home office's third-party debt, (2) the home office's swap
position with the foreign branch, (3) the foreign branch's swap position with the home office.
and (4) the foreign branch's swap position with the third party.
70 See supra text accompanying note I.
71 See	 § 904 (a) (1996).
72 See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
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with its foreign branch, gain and loss are split between U.S. and foreign
sources. Interest expense on the home office debt is allocated across
the taxpayer's entire domestic and foreign assets, reducing both U.S.
source and foreign source income." If the third-party swap (the only
leg, other than the debt, to be recognized) is not identified as a cost
of borrowing, 74
 then any gale' on the swap is sourced to Taxpayer's
residence" (or residence of the relevant business unit—here, the for-
eign branch77) that is, foreign source, so that the hedge fiills to produce
a net zero impact in terms of source." If the swap is identified properly,
any gain on the third-party swap reduces interest expense subject to
allocation and apportionment."
The result, therefore, is that to the extent the third-party swap is
identified as a cost of borrowing under the interest allocation rules, 8°
it should not make a difference that the interbranch swap is not
recognized because both the debt interest expense and the swap gain
or loss are effectively allocated and apportioned, producing a net zero
impact in terms of source. 8 ' Alternatively, to the extent the third-party
swap is not identified, loss is treated as it would be in any case in which
swap payments function as interest equivalents (i.e., it is allocated and
73 See Treas. Reg. § i .861-9T(b) (1) (1.996).
74 See id. § 1,861-9T(b) (6) (a product that can potentially alter taxpayer's effective cost of
borrowing with respect to an actual liability of the taxpayer).
75
 If the swap has gain (because the floating rate, LIBOR, increases), then correspondingly
!store interest will be owed on the debt for that period.
76 1f the swap has not been identified as a cost of borrowing, then gain on the swap dons not
reduce the taxpayer's total interest expense that is subject to apportionment. See Treas. Reg.
§ I.861-9T(b) (6) (iv)(B), In that case, the background rules for sourcing gain apply. See supra
text accompanying notes 31-32.
' 77 Notional principal contract income will be sourced to the residence of the branch (or,
more specifically, the QBU as defined in § 989(a) of the I.R.C. ifi
(I) the taxpayer's residence is the United States;
(2) the QBU's residence, as determined under 	 § 988(a)(3)(B)(ii), is out-
side the United States;
(3) the QBU is engaged in a trade or business in the country in which it is it
resident; and
(4) the notional principal contract is properly reflected on the books of the QBU.
Treas. Reg. § 1.863-7()) (2) (1991). See .urpra note 32.
7s Any loss is allocated and apportioned like interest expense, thus reducing U,S. and foreign
source income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.86 l-yr(b)(2). If there is loss on the third-party swap due to
a decline in floating interest ram, less interest will be owed on the debt during that period.
7g See id. § 1.861-9T(b) (6).
8° If Taxpayer had used an interbranch swap as well, the third-party swap might not be
identified as a cost of borrowing because that would be the role of the interbranch transaction.
g I
 Technically, swap loss is allocated and apportioned, and swap gain reduces interest ex-
penses subject to allocation and apportionment, See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b).
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apportioned across taxpayer's domestic and foreign assets) , 82 and gain
is foreign source, resulting in a sourcing mismatch."
This scenario, in which recognition or nonrecognition of inter-
branch contracts plays a minimal role, is limited to cases involving a
U.S. corporation's interest and interest equivalents because of the
special treatment accorded them. The serious source problem for
domestic corporations concerns a taxpayer, like the one in the intro-
ductory case of the currency swap, whose home office has a third-party
contract on which gain or loss is sourced by residence and is not subject
to apportionment." In that case, the gains and losses from the under-
lying position and the hedge contract will not offset for source pur-
poses, as demonstrated by the introductory case.
b. Foreign Corporation with US. Branch
The United States' nonrecognition of contractual risk-shifting within
a single multinational corporation produces tax distortions for U.S.
branches of foreign corporations that can be more significant than
those experienced by U.S. corporations. The reason is that unlike U.S.
corporations, foreign corporations are taxed almost exclusively on
their U.S. source income, so a general netting of income and loss
cannot be relied on to eliminate certain distortions."
In this example, Taxpayer is a foreign corporation with a U.S.
branch office. The branch enters into a Swiss franc interest rate swap
with a third party. 86
 Taxpayer may view the branch substantially as a
82 See I.R.C. § 864(e)(2) (1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b).
83
 Initially, it may appear advantageous not to identify here because a loss is treated no
differently than if it had been identified, and any gain would be foreign source income, potentially
increasing Taxpayer's ability to use foreign tax credits. The rules limiting foreign tax credits,
however, would probably classify this swap income in the "passive income basket," making it
virtually useless in increasing Taxpayer's use of foreign tax credits. Taxpayer, therefore, might
identify, and the impact on sourcing caused by the U.S. treatment of internal risk-shifting would
he muted. See Treas. Reg. § 1.904-4 (11) (1994).
"The example used in the text involves foreign currency. Many other items, however, are
sourced on a residence basis. The residence of the taxpayer rule governs source of gain on
notional principal contracts. See id. § 1.863-7(6)(1) (1991). Losses are allocated to the related
class of gross income. See id. §§ 1.863-7(e), 1,863-1(c) (1996), 1.861-8 (1995); see also I.R.C.
§ 865(a) (1996) (providing that gain from the sale of personal property is sourced to the
residence of the seller, unless covered by the enumerated exceptions).
88 See generally I.R.C. § 881 (a) (1996) (taxing foreign corporations on certain U.S. source
income not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business); § 882(a) (1996) (taxing foreign
corporations on income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business); § 864(c) (1)-(4)
(defining effectively connected income to cover most U.S. source income, and very limited
non-U.S. source income).
s6 Thus, the branch might agree to pay the third party the equivalent of a specified floating
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separate entity, particularly if Taxpayer is a bank. Assuming Taxpayer
is a bank, then for various banking and regulatory purposes, the
branch will be required to balance its books independent of the home
offices' Taxpayer will seek to have its U.S. branch balanced (hedged)
for U.S. tax purposes as well, because the United States taxes only the
branch, not the entire entity. The branch may decide to hedge its
third-party swap by entering into an offsetting swap with the home
office because, as observed earlier, the home office may be the best or
most efficient counter-party for the Swiss franc contract. As a result of
the swap, the branch's books are hedged economically for the Swiss
franc interest rate The home office will then hedge the risk with
a third party. For example, if the U.S. branch earns $100 on its third-
party position and pays $100 on the offsetting swap with the home
office, then the home office will receive $100 on the interbranch swap
and pay out $100 to a third party in the home country." Not only is
the entire corporation hedged for the risk, but the branch and the
home office are also hedged when considered independently. This is
important to the extent the home office or branch is taxed on a stand-
alone basis, which is the U.S. treatment of the branch.
With respect to U.S. branches of foreign entities, the United States
taxes the branch on income that is "effectively connected" with the
U.S. branch's business activities.'" Thus, it is necessary to identify in-
come and expenses properly associated with the U.S. branch."' The
determination of whether income is considered effectively connected
with the U.S. branch's business differs depending on the type of in-
come. Capital gains, as well as "FDAP" gains, 92
 are effectively connected
rate on X Swiss francs in return fbr receiving the equivalent of a specified fixed rate (e.g., nine
percent) on X Swiss francs. This contract is an 1.R.C. § 988 foreign currency contract for the
branch, assuming the branch's functional currency is the dollar. See Tress. keg. §§ 1.988-1(a) (6)
Ex. 10 (1992); 1.985-1(b) (3) (1994). In that case, the gain or loss earned by the branch on the
contract would be sourced to the residence of the branch, the United States. See I.R.C. § 988
(a) (3) (A) (1996).
87 See supra note 20.
SR
 The branch's swap with the home office, under which the branch would agree to pay the
home office the equivalent of a specified fixed rate of interest on X Swiss francs in return for
receiving a specified floating rate on X Swiss francs, would be an 1.R.C. § 988 fOreign currency
contract for the branch. Thus, any branch gain or loss on the contract would he U.S. source. See
supra note 2.
"Profit margins are omitted for simplicity. The gain and loss is expressed in dollars because
the branch would ultimately he reporting in dollars for U.S. tax purposes.
99
 See I.R.C. § 882(a).
91 See id. §§ 861, 862, 864 (1996).
92
 Fixed, determinable, annual or periodic income such as interest, dividends and rents, See
id. §§ 871(a)(1); 881 (1996).
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if they satisfy either the "asset use"" or "business activities J 4 test.''`' All
other U.S. source income (i.e., income that is not capital gains or
FDAP) is considered effectively connected with the branch's U.S. busi-
ness.96
 Deductions are permitted to the extent they are connected with
income that is effectively connected with the conduct of the branch's
business. 97 The U.S. branch's gain or loss on its two swap positions
would be U.S. source items effectively connected with the U.S. trade
or business.
Under the facts described above, if the transaction between the
U.S. branch and its home office (or other foreign branch) is not
recognized, then the net taxable income properly associated with the
activities of the U.S. branch will not be accurately determined. Given
that the home office's third-party swap usually is not attributed to the
U.S. branch or recognized for tax purposes by the United States, the
U.S. branch will be taxed as if its third-party position was the only
contract. Thus, the United States will tax the U.S. branch on $100 of
income despite the net zero impact of the hedged item and inter-
branch hedge." The direction of this inaccurate result is not predict-
able and could whipsaw either the taxpayer or the government. 99 In
the hypothetical, the U.S. branch had gain of $100 on its third-party
position and would be inappropriately taxed by the United States on
that gain. The branch, however, could just as easily have suffered a loss
on that contract and thus obtained an unwarranted reduction in U.S.
taxes.
The serious ramifications of the current tax rules for risk-shifting
within a single multinational corporation became publicly apparent in
November 1992, when Westpac Banking Corporation, a major Austra-
lian bank, was forced to cut its forecasted final dividend by fifty percent
due to an unanticipated U.S. tax charge of $115 million.'m The tax
charge was related to currency and interest rate swaps between West-
" Satisfying the asset use test depends on whether the income, gain, or loss derives from
assets used in the foreign taxpayer's U.S business. See id. ;§ 864(e) (2) (A).
91 Satisfying the business activities test depends on whether the activities of the foreign
taxpayer in the U.S. business were a material litctor in the realization of the income, gain, (gloss.
See id. § 864(c) (2) ( B).
95
 See I.R.C. § 864 (c) (2) .
91 ' See id. § 864(c) (3).
97 See id. § 873(a) (1996).
98 See generally Brown, supra note 7, at 167-68; Plambeck, Taxation of Global Trading, supra
note 15, at 1154.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
IN See Bruce Jacques, Westpac. Halves Payout Forecast in Prospectus, FIN. TIME-S, Nov. 6, 1992,
at 30.
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pac's New York branch and its non-U.S. branches during 1991 and
1992. 101 Westpac had to pay U.S. taxes on swap profits of the U.S.
branch without being able to offset the gain with the matching losses. 102
c. Domestic Interbranch Risk-Shifting
In the description of U.S. corporations with only domestic activi-
ties, the issue of different "branches" located within the United States
was not considered. The reason is that in most cases the business
decision to identify separate U.S. branches of a U.S. corporation (per-
haps geographically-based or activity-based divisions) has no impact on
taxes. The taxpayer is taxed currently by the United States on all gain
or loss and, if all activities are domestic, then all income is domestic
source.
Even in an all domestic context, however, the business use of
branches or, more commonly, divisions, may be relevant, and the
failure to recognize their use for tax purposes may result in tax distor-
tions. The failure to recognize interbranch or inter-division transac-
tions (even entirely domestic transactions) could produce a mismatch
in the timing of taxable income or loss, despite the fact that the
taxpayer has fully hedged that risk economically.'"
An example arises in the case of a U.S. bank which operates two
divisions, a treasury division and a dealer division, each with separate
and independent books and records.m The former makes business
investments and operates on an accrual basis. The latter, which buys
and sells financial instruments with customers, is required to use mark-
to-market accounting. 10r' The bank's treasury function may often seek
to hedge risk, such as interest rate exposure, with the dealer division,
which in turn hedges its net risk with a third party. The dealer division
101 See Robert Rice, Business and the Law: Double Trouble - Global Financial Trading Groups
Must Guard Against Inadvertently Paying Tax Twice Over, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1992, at 10.
w2 See id.
1 " See generally Banks Ask for Change in Hedging Reg. (Aug. 9, 1994), 94 TAx NOTF.S TonAy
167-11 (Aug. 25, 1994) [hereinafter Banks Ask for Change". '['he banks urged the Treasury to
apply the "separate entity election" approach from the consolidated group rules to separate
divisions of a single entity to prevent timing mismatches on hedging transactions. See id. The
banks sought to treat a single taxpayer with multiple activities, including some dealer activities
subject to the mark-to-market regime, as if the dealer activity were conducted by a separate
corporation in a consolidated group that had elected separate entity treatment. See id.
104 See id. at Exhibit B; see also Letter from Lawrence R. Ultlick, International Bankers Present
Position Paper on Cross-Border Interbranch Trading, HIG111.1GLITS AND Documarrs 51, 53 (Oct. 1,
1993).
1 °5 See 1.R.C. § 475 (1996).
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serves as an "intermediary" in hedging risk for reasons of efficiency
and economies of scale.
If the treasury division engages in a hedge with the dealer division,
Taxpayer could have a minimum of four transaction legs: (1) treasury's
position with a third party that creates interest rate risk (e.g., a debt
instrument); (2) treasury's swap with the dealer division that shifts the
interest rate risk to the dealer; (3) dealer's corresponding position in
the interest rate swap with treasury, and (4) dealer's swap with a third
party that hedges dealer's net exposure to interest rate risk (which may
be due to a combination of transactions, including the swap with
treasury). The interdivisional swap (i.e., legs 2 and 3) effectively iden-
tifies the gain or loss on that portion of the dealer division's aggregate
third-party positions that hedge the treasury division's risk.m€ For the
hedge to be effective for tax purposes, the treasury division's risk must
be matched with the hedge to eliminate any timing or character dis-
crepancies. The goal of the inter-division hedge is to accomplish this
by recognizing leg 2 as the hedge of the treasury division's third-party
debt (leg 1) and matching the timing of both positions pursuant to
the hedging rules under I.R.C. § 446."
If, however, the inter-division hedge is not recognized, the only
"existing" transactions are leg I , an accrual transaction, and leg 4, a
mark-to-market transaction. Often leg 4 may not be a full hedge of leg
1 because leg 4 is a hedge of the dealer division's net interest rate
exposure. For example, the dealer's net hedge in leg 4 may be hedging
only half of the risk of leg 1 because the dealer has other outstanding
positions that economically hedge the other half of that risk. In that
case, the taxpayer likely cannot identify a specific outstanding third-
party position of the dealer that is part of the effective hedge for the
treasury division risk. The reason is that there is no such transaction.
Rather, it is the net effect of the dealer division's positions that creates
part of the hedge. Without a specific transaction to identify, the tax-
payer fails to identify any hedge, much less one that is contemporane-
ously identified. 108
Assuming at least a portion of the treasury division's economic
hedge through the dealer division's position is not identified or qualified
for tax hedging treatment, then a timing mismatch occurs. Treasury
division's third-party debt (leg 1) is taxed on an accrual basis, but any
portion of the hedge effectuated by the dealer's aggregate third-party
116 See Banks Ask for Change, supra note 103, at Exhibit B.
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(b) (1996).
1 °8 See id. § 1.446-4(d)(1), (2).
July 1997]	 RISK-SHIFTING	 689
positionsm9
 is marked-to-market." Although the risk has been hedged
(that is, the combination of the hedged item and the hedge are eco-
nomically net zero transactions), the gain may be realized in one year
and the offsetting loss taken into account in a later year, producing a
timing mismatch that distorts taxable income. Therefore, recognition of
the inter-division hedging contract may be necessary to achieve the
accurate reflection of income contemplated by the hedging rules.'"
3. Assessment of the Current Rules on Internal Risk-Shifting
From the perspective of the U.S. tax system, which relies substan-
tially on legal status to identify taxpayers, a corporation generally
represents the smallest divisible taxable unit of an incorporated entity.
Transactions at a level smaller than that (e.g., between branches of a
corporation, or between the home office and a branch) usually are not
recognized for U.S. tax purposes."' Therefore, the swap transaction
between the U.S. home office of a bank and its foreign branch, or a
foreign bank home office and its U.S. branch, is not recognized and
has no tax effect.
This nonrecognition of risk-shifting within a corporation conflicts
with: (1) regulatory treatment,'' (2) the economic"' nature of the
iljg
 This could be, for example, the difference between leg 3 and leg 4 if the dealer division
did not need to enter into a third-party interest rate swap completely offsetting leg 3 because the
dealer division already had an aggregate third-party position that achieved a portion of that offset.
II° See I.R.C. § 475.
III See, e.g., Banks Ask Ihr Change, supra note 103 (arguing that the principles inherent in
the proposed hedging regulations for consolidated groups, as well as the legislative history of
I.R.C. § 475, support recognition of each interdivisional contract). See also 61 Fed. Reg. 517,
199f}-12 I.R.B. 4 (1996) (preamble to the final consolidated group hedging regulations under
1.R.C. §§ 446 and 1221, illustrating the matching concept); 59 Fed. Reg. 36,356, 36,358 (1994)
(preamble to the final § 446 of the hedging regulations explains that the regulations
require a clear reflection of income through the matching of income, deduction, gain, or loss
from a hedge, with that of the hedged item).
112 see, e.g., supra note 4.
113
 Banking regulations often guide banks towards the branch ibrm, but simultaneously
require the branch to maintain separate records as a way to assess the independent status and
stability of the individual branches,
114 1f the transactions have net zero economic effect hut, under the current rules, produce
a tax impact, the tax rules are in conflict with the underlying economics. Specifically, the tax law
in such a case impacts business behavior. II' the baseline ideal For tax rules is that they he neutral
in terms of impacting taxpayer behavior, then the current rules, which allow a net zero transaction
to produce a tax impact (either increasing or decreasing taxes), would clearly fail to meet the
ideal. To move toward a tax system that is "invisible" except for rates and source, the tax rules
for interbranch transactions and internal risk-shifting must be revisited. The mismatches pro-
duced by the current rules in the case of a U.S. corporation with a foreign branch, and even
more significantly in the case of a foreign corporation with a U.S. branch, are problematic for
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transaction,''' and (3) the tax treatment generally accorded inter-
branch (especially bank) transactions by other countries. These points
are in fact related. Most Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") countries would recognize a bank interbranch
hedging transaction because of the regulatory regime governing banks,
as well as the particular business functions of a bank." 6 Many countries
recognize interbranch transactions generally, including Denmark, Can-
ada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway (if the transac-
tion is at arm's length and for good reason), Switzerland and Australia
(for foreign bank branches).''' For example, the "U.K. will treat branches
of overseas corporations as though they are independent from their
head office and other branches."" 8 Besides the United States, a few
countries do not recognize interbranch transactions—Belgium, Fin-
land, the Republic of China and New Zealand." 9 The difference be-
tween the current U.S. approach to taxing interbranch transactions
and that of many other countries is considered further in Part III.P20
The tax consequences of the United States' failure to recognize a
U.S. corporation's interbranch transactions may be minor compared
to the impact of non-recognition on foreign corporations, particu-
larly financial institutions, with U.S. branches.l"t Theoretically, these
difficulties could be solved if the taxpayers used subsidiary structures
instead of branches. Given, however, that independent regulatory and
business standards may favor the branch form of organization, the tax
system should not be content to resolve problems of interbranch trans-
actions and risk-shifting within a corporation by pointing out the tax-
payer "option" of incorporating the branch." 2
the very reason that they will distort taxpayer behavior. There is no evidence that the current
rules were part of a policy determination to use the branch tax rules to impact hedging and
branch operations in the way in which they do.
In The current regime appears to "ignore the fact that the branches of a home office bank,
like divisions in a large corporation, normally operate as independent profit centers." Katcher &
Pawlow, supra note 58, at 25.
116 See, e.g., Stephen Brecher, The IRS - Out of Step with Its Trading Partners, 22	 Tax J.
20,20 (Summer 1996) ("Unlike many Of its OECD trading partners, the U.S. does not generally
recognize transactions between branches of the same entity for tax purposes."). See infra text
accompanying notes 191-200.
117 See Charles T. Plambeck et al., The General Ripart, TAX ASPECTS OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL.
INSTRUMENTS-GENERAL REPORT, CAHIERS DE DROVE FISCAL INTERNATIONAL VOL ',XXXI) 653, 687
& n.92 (1995). See generally Banque lndosuez, supra note 50.
118 Banque lndosuez, supra note 50, at Appendix B.
119 See Plambeck, supra note 117, at 687 & n.93.
126 See infra text accompanying notes 191-200.
121 See supra text accompanying note 85.
InAs another alternative, corporations that have separate branches and want to enter into
interbranch transactions could run the interbranch contract through a related subsidiary. For
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II. CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF RISK-SHIFFING WITHIN A GROU1'
OF RELATED CORPORATIONS
Having described the problems with the current tax treatment of
interbranch transactions and risk-shifting within a single corporation,
the next step is to outline the somewhat different tax treatment ac-
corded hedging transactions between legally separate but related enti-
ties. This Part reviews three basic cases in which related corporations
use financial instruments to hedge risk: (1) a U.S. corporation with a
domestic subsidiary; (2) a U.S. corporation with a foreign subsidiary;
and (3) a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary. The list does not
purport to exhaust every combination of participants (or instruments),
but rather to focus on useful examples. Not all cases pose a problem
to the same degree or in the same way, but each is included because
of the perspective it offers. In each case, the taxpayers use financial
instruments to shift, allocate, or centralize risk within a related group
in an attempt to maximize effective risk management. By reviewing
these related party cases, the inadequacy of the current tax treatment
of risk-shifting within a single corporation can be demonstrated, and
the inconsistency in the U.S. taxation of hedging by "single economic
units" (both related corporations and branches of a single corpora-
tion) can be explored.
A. Case 1: U.S. Corporation. with Domestic Subsidiary
1. Basic Financial Contract
a. Consolidated Group
In this case, Taxpayer is a U.S. corporation that is a member of an
affiliated group of corporations as defined under the consolidated
return provisions.'" Specifically, Taxpayer is a subsidiary corporation
example, if a branch in country li needs to enter into a swap hedging contract with the home
office in country A, but is concerned about problems arising from the lax treatment of such an
interbranch contract, it could instead enter into the hedge with a related corporation which
would itself hedge that risk with the home office, Assuming this kind of sandwich transaction
would be recognized for tax purposes, it nonetheless is not a particularly attractive alternative
due to the inefficiency and the transaction costs of invoking an additional party and another
contract. See, e.g., Bruce Haims et al., U.S. Thxation of International Banks, 4 INT'1, TAx REV. 5521
(May 1993) (raising the possibility that the intermediary subsidiary might be treated as a conduit);
Samuels & Brown, supra note 7, at 562 (questioning whether such back-to-back transactions would
be respected).
123
 Pursuant to § 1504 of the 	 an affiliated group constitutes one or more chains of
qualified corporations connected through stock ownership with a common parent, if two require-
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with a U.S. parent and U.S. brother/sister subsidiaries. Taxpayer enters
into an interest rate swap with a third party. The timing, character and
source rules discussed above in Part I.A.1 for a single U.S. corporation
apply.' 24 The only difference that the consolidated return rules make
is that after each member of the group has calculated its items of
income and loss separately, 125 these amounts are combined to arrive at
consolidated taxable income.' 26 Several additional steps involving com-
putations made on a consolidated basis follow.' 27
If Taxpayer enters into its speculative interest rate swap with a
member of the consolidated group, two additional rules come into
play. 128 First, all related party transactions are subject to arm's length
pricing rules, which demand that the income and loss on such trans-
actions "clearly reflect" income. 129 Second, consolidated group rules's°
regulate the matching of the two related parties' tax treatment of the
transaction."' The basic impact of the consolidated return rules as
applied to the interest rate swap is to match the inclusion of the related
meats are met. First, the common parent must directly own at least 80% of the voting power
(stock) or 80% of the value of one of the qualified corporations. Second, 80% of the vote or
value of each other qualified corporation must be owned directly by one or more other qualified
corporations. Qualified corporations do not include I.R.C. § 501 exempt organizations, insurance
companies, or foreign corporations. See I.R.C. § 1504(b) (1996).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 26-33. Section 446 of the I.R.C. governs timing, and
§§ 861 and 864 govern source, and character is generally considered ordinary.
125 Separate taxable income of the member is calculated under the rules generally applicable
to separate corporations, but with a few exceptions, including the treatment of intergroup
transactions, dividends, net operating losses and capital gains and losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-
12 (1996) (separate taxable income); § 1.1502-13 (1996) (intercompany transactions); § 1_1502-
14 (1996) (intercompany distributions); § 1.1502-21T (1996) (consolidated net operating loss);
§ 1.1502-221' (1996) (consolidated net capital gain or loss).
126 See id. § 1.1502-11 (1996) (computation of consolidated group taxable income).
127 See id. §§ 1.1502-11, 1.1502-21T (e.g., net operating loss deductions and capital gains).
128 A taxpayer might enter into a "speculative" swap position with a member of the consoli-
dated group under the following circumstances. If an entity's role is to trade for the group's own
account, it may seek to take a particular risk position. If another consolidated group member is
a market maker, then a risk seeker might choose to enter into its position with the market maker
member because transaction costs might be lower than if a third-party market maker were sought.
The market maker member would then face the decision of how to handle that risk, in particular,
whether to shill it to an unrelated party through an offsetting contract. Of course, if that is not
done, then the risk seeker's decision to take the risk on behalf of the group is undone.
129 See I.R.C. § 482 (1996) (i.e., that the pricing reflect the terms that would be charged an
uncontrolled party).
13° See id. 267 (1996) (otherwise governing the timing of loss and expense from related
party transactions, is generally trumped by the consolidated return regulations). See generally H.R.
REP. No. 98432, pt. 2, at 1579-80 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1206-07 (committee
reports stating that the amendments to I.R.C. § 267 were not intended to impact consolidated
groups).
191 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13 (1996).
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parties' income and loss from the transaction. The net effect for
purposes of the consolidated returns is likely to be a wash. 132 The
contract itself, however, is respected by the tax rules.
b. Unconsolidated or Unaffiliated Related Group
If Taxpayer's group were unconsolidated (affiliated but not filing
a consolidated return) or perhaps were a controlled but unaffiliated
group,'" the tax results of an interest rate swap with an unrelated party
would be subject to the same character, source and timing treatment
as the consolidated taxpayer and the baseline taxpayer."
If Taxpayer enters into the swap with a related party, arm's length
pricing rules would apply.'" Although the consolidated return match-
ing rules would not govern, other general related party coordination
rules would step in to regulate the matching of income and deduction
from transactions between related parties, including members of a
controlled group of corporations. 18"
2. Hedging Transaction: Unrelated Party
Taxpayer (member of a consolidated group) enters into an inter-
est rate swap with a third party in order to hedge its own debt.'
Because the swap hedges Taxpayer's own debt, this example is no
different, for present purposes, than the case of the individual corpo-
ration hedging its own debt (with the additional layer of consolidated
return rules regarding the members' separate taxable incomes, fol-
132
 Although the general purpose and effect of the consolidated return rules is to minimize
the importance of the treatment of individual members, in particular cases it is nonetheless
relevant which transactions arc reported on which members' books (for example, when different
members of the group use different accounting measures or when a member is sold or leaves the
consolidated group).
133
 For example, it' the group were between 50% and 80% commonly owned.
134 Thus, if a member of a controlled group entered into an interest rate swap with a third
party, § 446 of the I.R.C. would govern timing, character would likely be ordinary, and source
would be covered by §§ 861 and 864 of the I.R.C. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
133
 See LR.C. § 482 (1996).
136
 Fur purposes of § 267 of the I.R.C., which limits related party losses and deductions, a
controlled group is defined as one or more chains of corporations connected through stock
ownership with a common parent where more than 50% of the vote or value of each corporation
(except the common parent corporation) is owned by one or more of the other corporations
and the common parent owns more than 50% of the vote or value of at least one of the other
corporations. I.R.C. § 267(f) (1996) (citing and modilying the definition in I.R.C. § 1563(a)
(1996)).
137 Assume that here, as with the baseline taxpayer, the taxpayer seeks to transform its floating
rate debt into fixed rate debt.
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lowed by the computation of special consolidated items).' 38 The one
caveat is that members of a consolidated group are required to allocate
and apportion interest expense (and interest equivalents) of each
meinber of the group as if the group were a single corporation.'" Here,
if all assets owned by the consolidated group are U.S. assets, then any
income or loss on the hedge is U.S. source.
If Taxpayer is a member of an unconsolidated affiliated group or
is a member of a controlled group, the tax treatment of the hedging
transaction is the same as for the baseline taxpayer hedging its debt."'
3. Hedging Transaction: Related Party
With the basic framework for consolidated and affiliated group
hedging transactions established, we can consider the interesting case
of a taxpayer (here, a member of the consolidated group) hedging
with a member of its own consolidated group. Instead of directly
entering into a third-party interest rate swap, Taxpayer turns to a
member of the group. Often this member may serve as the risk pooling
and management center for all of the group's .interest rate risk."' The
risk management function can be handled in two different ways. 142
05 See supra text accompanying notes 34-47.
159 All interest expense is allocable to all of the gloss income of the members, and all the
assets of 	 the members are taken into account in apportioning the interest expense. See
§ 864(e) (I ) (1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-11T(c) (1988). Financial corporations within the con-
solidated group are treated separately, however. See Treas. Reg. § 1.861–I md)(4)(i). Thus, the
consolidated group is bifurcated into two separate affiliated groups; the financial group and the
nonfinancial group. See id. § 1.861-11T(d) (4) (ii). Keeping interest expense within each group
is intended to provide a fairer approximation of the consolidated picture because the financial
group would predictably provide a disproportionate amount of interest expense.
141/ See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
141
 As in the prior examples of interbranch (and inter-desk) hedging, it is useful to .specify
the business necessity and motivation underlying the in tra-consolidated group hedges. Certainly,
a member with a risk to hedge could enter into an offsetting contract with an unrelated third
party, and by doing so would have immediately transferred the risk (economically) outside the
entire group. Often, however, that hedging route may not be the most efficient or cost effective
hedging strategy for the group. Such a strategy would require each member to have someone
monitoring and negotiating third-party contracts—expertise would be diluted and information
costs likely higher because each hedge would be performed with a third party If, in the alterna-
tive, one member of the group handles the risk management function, then several benefits can
he achieved: (1) risk management/hedging expertise is centralized; (2) transaction costs are
reduced because of shared inlOrmation; and (3) the number of third-party hedging contracts
necessary may he reduced because (a) the risk ['tanager can monitor whether, for example,
member A's currency risk is offset by member I3's currency position (both risks which could be
transferred for monitoring and accountability purposes to the risk manager), and (b) the risk
manager can enter into a single third-party contract to offset currency risk faced by both member
A and member B.
142 See Frank Hertz et al., Thxation of Hedging Transactions: Final and Proposed Regs Leave
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First, the group members may enter into contracts with the risk
manager to explicitly shift all of the particular risk to the risk manager.
For example, in this case Taxpayer enters into an interest rate swap
with the risk manager in which Taxpayer agrees to pay the fixed rate
in return for receiving the floating rate. As a result, the risk manager
bears the risk of interest rate movement and Taxpayer has hedged its
risk. The risk manager then assesses its net risk (perhaps having taken
on other members' interest rate risk as well) and hedges the net
exposure with a third party. Effectively, each member of the group has
transferred interest rate risk by contract to the risk manager who
hedges the net risk with a third party. The result is that each member,
viewed individually, has economically hedged this risk, and the group,
viewed as a whole, has hedged the risk as well.
An alternative way in which the risk manager could operate does
not. involve a contract between Taxpayer and the risk manager. Instead,
the risk manager simply analyzes the consolidated group as a whole,
assesses the net interest rate risk position of the group and enters into
a third-party hedge to offset it. 143
 In that case, the group, taken as a
unit, is hedged for the particular risk, but the members of the group
viewed individually are not hedged because of the absence of an
offsetting contract between each member and the risk manager.'"
Thus, although each member may consider itself to have neutralized
its interest rate risk, on a stand alone basis each member's books show
a risk (and ultimately unpredictable gain or loss) from interest rate
movement.
Depending on the hedging pattern used, the tax treatment differs.
Under the basic hedging rules, various advantages (including matched
timing and character treatment of the hedge and hedged item) inure
to taxpayers whose economic hedge is treated as a hedge for tax
purposes as wel1. 145
 To qualify as a tax "hedging" transaction, the hedge
Many Unanswered Questions, 64 TAx NOTES 1597, 1610-12 (1994) (describing alternative struc-
tures for group hedging activity). See generally 59 Fed. Reg. 30,394 (1994) (preamble to Prop.
Treas. keg. [i?ii 1.446-4(c), 1.1221-2(d),(e),(1)); I.R.S. Notice 94-49, 1994-1 GB. 358, 359 (de-
scribing single and separate entity approaches); Charles T. Plambeck, Comnuaas on the Proposed
Hedging Regulations, 94 TAX No•rEs Tonnv 245-28 (Dec. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Platnbeek,
Comments].
k3 The new rules that were specifically designed For consolidated groups in recognition of
their special circumstances are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 150-61,
141
 See, e.g., Platnbeck, Comments, supra note 142; Reich, supra note 7, at 18,
145 See, e.g, Treas, Reg. §§ 1.1221-2(a) (1996) (capital assets do 1101 include property that is
part of a hedging transaction); § 1.446-4(b) (1996) (to clearly reflect income, the gain, loss,
income or expense front the hedge must match the corresponding amounts from the hedged
item); we also 1.R.C. § 1256(e) (1996) (exception to the mark-to-market treatments available for
qualified hedging transactions).
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must reduce the taxpayer's own risk."6 Hedging a related party's risk
(for example, as described in the alternative consolidated group hedg-
ing pattern) does not constitute a "hedging transaction" for either the
member taxpayer or the risk manager because neither possesses both
an underlying risk and an offsetting hedge. Each holds only one of the
two transactions rather than a pair.
Thus, in the first pattern of related party hedging (actual contract
between member-taxpayer and risk manager), Taxpayer's interest rate
risk is hedged for tax purposes because the related-party swap serves
as the "hedge" for Taxpayer. 17 The related party oversight rules apply,
as they did in the "speculative" consolidated group swap." 8 In the case
of the alternative pattern of consolidated group risk centralization, the
absence of a contract between the group members (the taxpayer and
the risk manager) means that the taxpayer has not entered into a
hedging contract. Moreover, the risk manager does not have a hedge
because its contract with the third party does not hedge a risk of the
manager. Therefore, under the basic hedging rules, there would be no
hedge and no coordination of the timing and character of the tax-
payer's third-party debt and the risk manager's third-party swap. 19
However, hedging rules drafted specifically for consolidated groups
provide additional flexibility and grant some formal recognition to the
variety of related party hedging in the consolidated group context.
Under these rules, two different tax treatments for consolidated group
hedging transactions are available: (1) the single entity approach, and
(2) the separate entity approach. 15°
The single entity approach applies in the absence of a separate
entity election'5 ' and permits members of the consolidated group to
hedge the risk of other members as if the separate corporations were
1"P See Treas, Reg. §§ 1.1221-2; 1.446-4(a), (b).
147 The risk manager may or may not have a "hedge transaction" of its own. To qualify for
hedging treatment under Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-2, the position being hedged (in the case of the
risk manager, that is the swap with the member) must be ordinary property. Treas. Reg. § 1,1221-
2(b)(1). For these purposes, property is ordinary to a taxpayer "if a sale or exchange of the
property by the taxpayer could not produce capital gain or loss regardless of the taxpayer's
holding period when the sale or exchange occurs." Id. § 1.1221-2(c) (5) (i). The contract is most
likely to he ordinary if the manager is a dealer in financial instruments and the contracts are
inventory.
148 See LR.C. §§ 482, 1502 (1996).
149 Important benefits of the tax system's recognition of a hedge include coordination of
timing and character to ensure that a net zero economic position does not produce a tax effect.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 36, 103-111.
15° See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-4(e) (9); 1.1221-2(d).
151 See id. § 1.446-4 (e) (9) (i) , (ii) .
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all divisions of a single corporation. 152 A related party contract, such as
the swap between Taxpayer and the risk manager, would be unneces-
sary and (in the absence of a separate entity election) would not
constitute a hedging transaction or a hedged item. The risk manager's
third-party swap would be considered to hedge Taxpayer's debt instru-
ment.'" Thus, the character of the third-party hedge would be deter-
mined by reference to Taxpayer's original transaction (the debt).'''
Similarly, the timing of the third-party hedge and Taxpayer's position
would be matched. 155
The character and timing treatment available under the single
entity regime provide economically sensible results if in fact there is
no related party contract and the focus is only on a group basis, rather
than a stand-alone analysis.' 56 The character of the risk-creating trans-
action (Taxpayer's debt) and the hedge (the risk manager's third-party
swap) match, as do their timing. Given that these are the only con-
tracts, all is balanced on a net group basis (i.e., when a consolidated
return is filed).' 57
 To the extent the members of the group view them-
152 See id. § 1.446-4(c) (9) (1) ("all of the members are treated as if they were divisions of a
single corporation"),
153 See id. §§ 1_446-4 (e) (9) (i); 1.1221-2 (d ) (1) .
154 See id. ,§§ 1.1221-2(a)(1), 1.1221-2(b), 1.1221-2(d) (4) Ex. 1. If a transaction is identified
by the taxpayer as a hedging transaction, then any gain on the hedge is considered ordinary
income. A toss on a transaction identified by the taxpayer as a hedge, however, is not necessarily
ordinary in character. A transaction must actually qualify as a hedging transaction, not just he
identified as such, in order for a loss on the hedge to be treated as ordinary, and not capital.
This is the taxpayer whipsaw of the § 1221 hedge identification requirement. Id. § 1,1221-
2 (e), ( 1).
155 See '1'reas. keg. § 1.446-4(e),
151 ; See, e.g., Plambeck, Comments, supra note 142.
157 01 course, the absence of a contract between taxpayer and the risk manager means that
both of their accounts, when viewed separately, do not balance for either economic or tax
purposes. Given the earlier analysis, which highlighted both the business reasons for inter-mem-
ber hedges (keeping track of responsibility for risk; quantifying and specifying the nature and
location of risk) as well as the tax benefits (ensuring that each member's positions are balanced,
in addition to the group as a whole, so that any computation that needs to be done on an
individual basis, e.g., upon sale or departure of a member from the group, is an accurate
reflection of the member's situation), this raises the question of why all consolidated groups do
not use inter-member transactions,
With respect to the business reasons fOr such contracts, there are sonic cases in which there
is less pressure to track risk responsibility and less capacity in the internal accounting structure
to maintain separate risk balances—probably because the issues arise fairly infrequently. For
example, if a U.S. manufacturing subsidiary that operates primarily in dollars suddenly finds itself
with a Deutschmark risk on a contract, it may turn to its parent's main treasury department and
ask them to take care of the risk. 11 the situation arises infrequently it may not be necessary to
use inter-member contracts to monitor each member's role.
Even in this case, however, it arguably would be useful to have such contracts for tax purposes
in the event that calculations must he made at sonic point on a separate entity basis. If the tax
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selves as part of a single economic unit, the hedging effect is main-
tained for tax as well as economic purposes. Floating rate interest
payments owed by the group (specifically by taxpayer) are offset by the
right to receive comparable floating rate payments under the third-
party swap, leaving the "group" with an obligation to pay the equivalent
of a fixed rate interest payment.
A separate entity election is available for taxpayers that use a
central risk manager but enter into intercompany swaps to actually
transfer the risk within the consolidated group.' 58 To qualify for this
treatment, the risk manager of the group must account for transactions
on a mark-to-market basis.'`'' This requirement may pose a serious
barrier to the separate entity election if the risk manager is not usually
on that accounting method. In addition, the consolidated group must
make an overall choice between single entity and separate entity treat-
ment—a decision that requires the group to consider what hedging
scenarios will be most common—and whether it is preferable to bal-
ance accounts on a group basis or a stand-alone basis.
Of course, none of the consolidated group hedging rules apply to
a taxpayer that is part of an affiliated but unconsolidated group or part
of a controlled group.' 6° In those cases, each taxpayer must hedge its
own risks, although it can do so through related party contracts. That
hedging is governed by the rules for a single U.S. corporation except
for the additional application of the related party rules.' 61
department has a prominent role in business decisions, the entity would probably prefer having
the inter-member contracts because the separate accounts have relevance and the tax department.
would want to keep them correctly. Two possible explanations for the absence of contracts in
such cases despite the tax role they might play someday are: (1) if the situations are infrequent
and mu suhslantial compared to the overall activity of the member, the relative impact of an
unbalanced position for tax purposes might not be tremendous; and (2) the tax department
might not play a significant role in business decisions.
There appears to be no tax policy reason to penalize corporations operating under these
conditions. This is implicitly the view adopted in the final consolidated group hedging regulations
which offer the single entity approach as the baseline. Moreover, the single entity approach is
consistent with the general tax view of consolidated groups as a single taxpayer.
11.44 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-4(e) (9) (ii); 1.1221-2(d)(2).
155 See id, §1:i 1.446-4 (e) (9) (ii) ; 1.1`221-2(d) (2) (ii)
"'" See id. §§ 1.1221-2(d)(I), (2) (prescribing the hedging treatment for a consolidated
group); 1.446-4(e)(9)(i), (ii) (same); 1.1221-2(d) (3) (defining "consolidated group" pursuant
to I.R.C. § 1502 and the regulations thereunder); 1.446-4(e) (9) (iii) (same); T.D. 8653, 1996-12
I.R.B. 41, 61 Fed. Reg. 517, 517-518 (fan. 8, 199(1) (preamble to the final consolidated group
hedging rules under I.R.C. §§ 446 and 1221 regulations).
161 See I.R.C. §§ 267, 482 (1996).
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B. Case 2: U.S. Corporation with Foreign Subsidiary
1. Basic Financial. Contract
Taxpayer, a U.S. corporation with a wholly-owned foreign subsidi-
ary, enters into a speculative interest rate swap with a third party. The
tax treatment is the same as that for the baseline taxpayer with no
related parties. 162 If instead of entering into the swap with a third party,
Taxpayer enters into it with the foreign subsidiary, the tax results are
the same except that arm's length pricing is required'tt3
 and related
party matching principles apply. 164
 Consolidated group rules are inap-
plicable because a foreign corporation cannot be a member of a
consolidated group.'''•
2. Hedging Transaction
If Taxpayer enters into an interest rate swap with a third party to
hedge its debt, the timing and character of income or loss on the swap
is determined as outlined above in the baseline hedge scenario.' 66
Because the interest rate swap functions as an interest equivalent,' 67
Taxpayer is subject to the allocation and apportionment of swap ex-
pense for source purposes.' 68
Assuming the hedge qualifies as a properly identified cost of
borrowing, however, any gain reduces interest subject to allocation and
apportionment. Taxpayer "owns" some foreign assets based on its own-
ership of the foreign subsidiary. 1139
 So, under the apportionment for-
mula, a portion of any swap loss would be foreign source. As noted
earlier, because the United States taxes residents on their worldwide
income regardless of source, the primary effect of source of income
for a U.S. corporation involves calculation of the foreign tax credit.' 7°
I" See supra text accompanying notes 26-35. Because the swap is not an interest equivalent
and does not alter the effective cost of borrowing, no allocation or apportionment is required,
so any gain or loss is U.S. source (residence of the taxpayer). See supra text accompanying notes
39-43.
163 See I.R.C. § 482.
k 64
 Generally, a taxpayer must use the cash method of accounting for deductions of amounts
owed to related foreign persons. See Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3(b) (1) (1992).
166 .5ee I.R.C. § 1504(b) (3) (1996).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 34-47.
167 See Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b) (4) (1996).
16M See id. § 1.861-9T.
I" See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.861-9T(g), (b) (3)—(5), 1.861-12T(c) (2) (vi), ex. 2 (1996).
I" See supra text accompanying notes 4-5, 70-71.
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If Taxpayer enters into this swap with its foreign subsidiary instead
of a third party, the only difference is the application of the related
party oversight requirements.' 7 '
C. Case 3: Foreign Corporation with U.S. Subsidiary
Obviously, foreign corporations with no transactions or activities
in the United States are not subject to U.S. income tax. Moreover, the
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation is usually taxed no differently
on its financial instrument transactions, including hedging transac-
tions, than the baseline domestic corporation considered in Part I.A.1.
If the U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation enters into a hedging
transaction with the foreign parent, no new rules apply. As with an
entirely domestic related party hedge, the contract is fully recognized
for tax purposes, and the only special rules are arm's length pricing
and coordination rules. 172 Paralleling the case of a U.S. parent and a
foreign subsidiary, a U.S. subsidiary cannot file a consolidated return
with a foreign parent.'"
III. COMPARISON OF THE TAXATION OF RISK-SHIFTING
WITHIN A SINGLE CORPORATION TO RISK-SHIFTING WITHIN
A GROUP OF RELATED CORPORATIONS
This Part examines how and why U.S. taxation of risk-shifting
within a corporation is not only arbitrary, but also inconsistent with
the tax treatment of risk-shifting within a multinational group of re-
lated corporations. The inconsistency is explored through a compari-
son with the three related party cases outlined in Part II. The compara-
tive analysis begins with the determination that interbranch transactions
are not significantly different in kind from related party transactions.
The concerns raised by both transactions are grounded in the same
intuitions about taxpayer behavior. As a result, comparable tax rules
should be considered. This Part first reviews the common features and
171 See I.R.C. §§ 267, 482 (1996); see supra text accompanying notes 135-136. The basic rules
applicable would still be § 446 of the I.R.C. for timing, and § 1221 for ordinary character.
Sourcing under the allocation and apportionment rules would result in some fraction of any loss
going to reduce foreign source income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-9T (1996).
1712 See1.R.C. §§ 267(a) (3), 482 (1996). The precise application of the matching rules in § 267
of the I.R.C. for payments by a U.S. person to a related foreign person has been debated. See
Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 F.3d 99, 101, 103 (3d Cir. 1996) (reversing the decision of
the Tax Court and finding Treas. Reg. § 1.267(a)-3, which requires an accrual basis taxpayer to
defer deductions for certain amounts paid to a related foreign person until the year actually paid,
a valid exercise of the Secretary's power under 1.R.C. § 267(a) (3) (1996)).
175 See I.R.C. § 1504(b) (3) (1996).
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risks of interbranch and related party transactions and then evaluates
the handling of these concerns in the related party context. Finally,
this Part reflects on the fact that, unlike other major industrialized
nations, the United States does not recognize contractual risk-shifting
within a corporation. 174
 Part IV will culminate the analysis by translating
some of the observations from this Part into recommendations for the
treatment of risk-shifting within a multinational corporation.
A. Common Features, Common Concerns, Dissimilar Rules
1. Basic Comparison
The United States' examination of internal risk-shifting and inter-
branch transactions typically starts with the premise that a taxpayer
cannot deal with itself. The view seems intuitively sensible because the
economic benefits and burdens of ownership do not change following
such an internal transaction. A typical example would be the absurdity
of selling your house to yourself. Carrying this premise forward, the
conclusion is that branch transactions cannot be acknowledged by the
tax system because they too are examples of self-dealing. Under this
framework, a comparison with related party transactions is rejected
because such cases involve two distinct taxable entities (e.g., two cor-
porations owned by the same shareholders). A rapid dismissal is un-
warranted, however, and in fact, the related party analogy is an illumi-
nating one. Although the two cases are different when measured by a
standard that judges self- dealing based on legal status, they are similar
when measured by a standard that judges self-dealing based on eco-
nomic ownership.
The element that links related party transactions and interbranch
transactions, and that underlies the special tax issues they raise, is
common ownership. Ultimately, individuals are the smallest taxable
units and are the true bearers of the tax burdens. Corporations are
legal fictions and their status as taxable entities is merely a structural
feature of our system. 175
 In the end, it is individual taxpayers who bear
even the corporate tax."" When two corporations that are commonly
owned (i.e., ultimately owned by the same individuals) enter into a
t74 See generally supra note 4.
175
 Although some would argue that multinationals have become so powerfitl, and to some
degree independent, that they should he thought of as taxpayers in their own right.
176
 Even though the specific incidence of the corporate tax is highly debated (e.g., sharehold-
ers, workers, consumers), the framework of the debate demonstrates the shared understanding
that it is individuals who truly bear tax burdens, and that the only question is which individuals
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transaction, it may be viewed in substance (that is, economically), but
not form (legal status), as self-dealing.'"
The question, then, is what is the concern raised by common
economic ownership. The primary fear is that the parties will behave
in a way that maximizes their joint after-tax benefit at the expense of
the government. Although such a scenario is not impossible when
unrelated parties deal, it is particularly common and problematic with
related parties because tax rules locate gain and loss in specific taxpay-
ers by relying on the parties' stated transaction terms and prices. If the
two participants are commonly owned, it is less economically relevant
where the profit is booked because a single set of owners bears the
benefits and burdens of both companies. As a result, common owner-
ship may lead the parties to structure their transactions and engage in
pricing strategies designed to maximize their joint after-tax position
instead of each party maximizing its own benefit, which is the economi-
cally rational behavior of an independent entity. The abuse potential
of strategic profit-shifting by taxpayers exists regardless of their legal
structure as related subsidiaries or as branches.
The response of the tax system to related party transactions has
been to recognize them, but simultaneously to limit the potential
abuse.' 78
 The system requires scrutiny of the pricing and timing of
related party transactions to ensure that the transactions are arm's
length and that the participants are unable to manipulate their ac-
and in what proportion. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S.
Perspective, 9 EMORY L. REV. 71, 89 (1995) ("Those who have studied the incidence of the
corporate tax have reached inconclusive results."); Emil M. Smiley, Corporate Integration: An
'Economic Perspective., 47 Inx L. REV. 621, 636 (1992) rile incidence of the corporate income
tax has been long debated. The popularity of the corporate tax may well be due to the fact that
no one knows who pays it." (footnote 0/flitted)).
I77 Focusing here on the ultimate econennic ownership highlights the similarity between
related party transactions and interbranch nansactions. There is some sense, however, in which
risk-shifting is "real" as between related companies but not as between branches. Although related
companies are continently owned and thus one economic entity vis-a-vis the ultimate owner,
individual creditors of a contpany are generally forced to view that company in isolation and
cannot call upon the resources of the broader economic group. This dichotomy arises from the
imperfect intersection of economics and law. As a factual matter, a single ultimate Owner may
control several wholly owned subsidiaries, bin that economic observation is obscured by the
formal decision to grant each corporation an identity distinct from its related corporations and
from its owner. This kind of distinction, however, may have less relevance here than first appears
because interbranch and related party transactions should be arm's length, so it is not an occasion
for one-sided shifting of assets out of a corporation. Related party transactions and interbranch
transactions are similar because of common ownership, but appear different because d' the
formal distinctions that are imposed and given weight (for example, the general requirement
that the existence of a corporation as distinct from its shareholders be respected. See, e.g., Moline
Properties, Inc, v, Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943)).
178 See, e.g.,	 §§ 267, 482 (1996).
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counting rules to accelerate deductions and defer income. To the
extent that taxpayers stay within the boundaries of "non-abusive" trans-
actions, however, the related party transactions are fully respected.
The tax system treats interbranch transactions differently from
related party transactions, despite the economic parallel. In the case
of related party transactions, the tax system balances the danger of
common economic ownership with respect for legal status as separate
entities. Thus, related party transactions are allowed (subject to certain
rules) because they are not self- dealing, whereas interbranch contracts
are not allowed because the participants are parts of a single legal
entity and thus are engaged in self-dealing. This picture, however,
overstates the distinction between branches and subsidiaries on legal
status grounds and obscures the more complicated parallels.
The reason that branches do matter and that their risk shifting is
important for the tax system to recognize is because various rules (e.g.,
jurisdiction, source rules, regulatory regimes, currency rules) ascribe
some significance to the branch itself even though the branch is not
considered an independent legal entity. Where the tax rules create
significant legal distinctions within a single economic entity, the tax
system must take account of the resulting discrepancy in designing
other tax rules.' 79
 The risk here is not that income allocations will be
distorted by the taxpayer trying to minimize tax, but that income
allocations will be distorted by tax rules that are noneconomic and
potentially over-inclusive or under-inclusive of taxable income. If some
legal rules treat a single corporation (a legal status determination) as
de facto multiple entities then it may be necessary for certain tax rules
to do so in order to produce economically sensible taxation that does
not distort the taxpayer's behavior. Thus, if branches of a single cor-
poration face some rules that rely on the independent status of the
branches, then it may be necessary to acknowledge interbranch trans-
actions in order to tax income more accurately.
What this discussion suggests is that branches and subsidiaries are
more similar than initially indicated on both legal status and economic
grounds. Related parties are like branches in that they have single
economic ownership; branches are like related parties in that some
legal distinctions treat them as separate. These observations again
encourage development of tax rules that reflect the complex interac-
179 For example, such rules include I.R.C. § 475 which specifies a particular accounting
method for a t•xpayer's dealer function, fj 985(b)(1)(B) which determines functional currency
on the basis of each business unit, and § 864 which essentially permits the United States to tax
foreign cxwporations only on the activities of the U.S. branch of the corporations.
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tion of economics and law. Moreover, the significance of any special
fear regarding branch transactions is substantially vitiated by the rec-
ognition that the government's real cause for concern is the same in
both cases—that the two sides of the transaction share a single eco-
nomic owner and economic goal. As a result, both interbranch and
related party transactions should be analyzed through the interaction
of economic income (i.e., common ownership) and legal rules (both
legal status (i.e., incorporation) and legal distinctions (e.g., jurisdiction
and source)).
The risk of taxpayers engaging in abusive transactions exists with
both related party and branch contracts because of two basic facts.
First, the existence of separate taxing jurisdictions enables a taxpayer
to shift income strategically to a lower or no- tax jurisdiction. Second,
the fact that tax rules ascribe some independent tax relevance to
branches and subsidiaries provides other opportunities to place in-
come strategically.' 80 For related party transactions, the tax system over-
comes these risks by applying special pricing and timing rules. Rather
than relying on the "market" to set contract terms, the regulations
provide the framework. If this mechanism works in the related party
context, it should be feasible with interbranch transactions as well. In
other words, from an anti-abuse perspective, can self-dealing (transac-
tions within the same entity as defined by legal status) be any different
from related party contracts when the economic substance is under-
stood and considered? Why would the rules governing related parties
not provide adequate protection in the interbranch context?
Despite the parallels, the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service")
has declined to apply § 482 of the I.R.C. to interbranch transactions
except in the context of an Advanced Pricing Agreement ("APA")
negotiated with a country with which we have a treaty.'8 ' The Service
180 The emphasis in the analysis on taxable units and jurisdiction is not the same as saying
this is all about source and that good source rules would solve the problem. Expressing it as a
question of source may not help much because the question then becomes whether source should
be different here?—and if so, why? If the why turns on the role of the intermediary branches, we
are back to this question about taxable units, at least to some extent. Moreover, problems arise
even in a domestic context with inter-desk transactions or any other case where different pieces
of the economic whole owned by a taxpayer face different tax rules (e.g., dealer status, loss
limitation, etc.). See supra text accompanying notes 103-11.
181 .See First ,4PA Covering Cross -Border, Interbranch Bank Transactions, 1995 DAILY TAX REP.
45, d3 (Mar. 8, 1995). The IRS has taken the position that such treatment is not available under
domestic tax law, but that the taxation of permanent establishments and business profits under
the treaties permits (hut does not require) treating interbranch transactions like related party
transactions. The practicing bar has continued to argue that interbranch transactions should be
governed by the transfer pricing rules in ,§ 482 of the 1.R.C. and that the taxpayers would then
demonstrate that their activities satisfied the arm's length requirements. Banks Urge IRS lo Keep
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and Treasury, however, have recently expressed interest in applying
482 transfer pricing principles to certain cross-border interbranch
financial transactions and "are drafting proposed rules under sections
861 through 865 that could introduce elements associated with the
arm's length principle in determining income allocations from cross-
border interbranch transactions in derivatives, foreign exchange, secu-
rities, and other financial products."182 The Service, though, has em-
phasized that "the proposed rules would not provide blanket recognition
of separate entity treatment of banks and financial institutions with
branches, adding the government does not anticipate taking such
action in any other regulation or proposal." 183
 These developments
indicate some willingness on the part of the government to rethink the
traditional view of branch transactions.
2. Insights from Consolidated Groups
In addition to the observatiOns drawn from a comparison of in-
terbranch and related party transactions, more insights can be ob-
tained from studying consolidated groups. The tax treatment of con-
solidated groups provides further evidence of the flexibility the tax
system is capable of using to improve economic taxation in a regime
that is based on legal determinations of taxpayer identity. Although
consolidated groups approach these questions from the opposite di-
rection (by treating legally separate entities as a single entity for tax
purposes), the accommodations made by the consolidated return hedg-
ing rules acknowledge: (1) that underlying common ownership is sig-
nificant, and (2) that a combination of business circumstances and
regulatory treatment can make it matter where items are located, even
in a commonly owned group.
Thus, separately incorporated entities are treated as a single entity
for purposes of the consolidated, hedging rules if that treatment more
accurately reflects the economic Activity of the group as a whole. For
example, consolidated groups that use centralized risk management
and have the risk manager monitor and hedge members' risk, but do
not use inter-member contracts to explicitly shift the risk, may be
treated as a single entity for hedging.'" A third-party risk faced by one
Pledge to Publish Guidance on Interbranch Trading APAs, 1996 DAILY TAX REP. 55, dl 1 (Mar,
21, 1996).
152
 U.S. May Apply Arm's Length Elements to Interbranch Transactions, Official Says, 1996 DAILY
TAX REP. 150, d5 (July 8, 1996).
153 /d.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 150-57.
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member can be hedged by the risk manager without an inter-member
contract, and the hedge will be accorded the full benefits (e.g., coor-
dinated character and timing) of a tax hedge. The existence of single
entity and separate entity hedging treatment for consolidated groups
grew out of the uneasy and sometimes conflicting intersection of eco-
nomic substance and legal rules.' 85
 The tax law starts with legal status
(separate corporations) but incorporates economic substance by allow-
ing consolidated filing. Nonetheless, the significance of each corpora-
tion as a separate entity is not eliminated, and separate status can play
an important role in hedging. Ultimately, the consolidated group ex-
amples reveal that the decision to incorporate is not determinative and
that the tax law must, at least in some circumstances, look beyond
formal status.
3. Integrating the Analysis of Interbranch, Related Party and
Consolidated Group Transactions
Following the theme implicit in the taxation of consolidated groups,
if treating branches as separate and recognizing their interbranch
contracts provide a tax result that is more consistent with the underly-
ing economics and is thus less likely to distort taxpayer behavior, then
that treatment should be seriously considered. 186 The point is not that
legal status is irrelevant and only economic reality matters. Rather, the
point is that in order to design tax rules that follow the economic
activity and do not unintentionally distort taxpayer behavior, we must
recognize both the overriding impact of common ownership for sepa-
rate, related entities and the impact of legal distinctions that do not
rise to the level of producing legally separate entities. It is through an
understanding of these factors that the existence of three distinct
cases—(1) related party transactions; (2) special consolidated group
hedging; and (3) recognized interbranch transactions—could logically
co-exist.
185 See, e.g., Preamble to Proposed Regulations for Hedging Transactions by Members of a
Consolidated Group, 59 Fed. Reg. 36,394 (July 18, 1994) (discussing the role of single entity
versus separate entity treatment of consolidated groups with reference to the business and
economic structure of the activities anti the general approach under consolidation).
186
 The result is not one of unfettered taxpayer electivity. As noted earlier, various anti-abuse
measures temper the risks of strategic taxpayer behavior in a commonly owned group. See supra
text accompanying notes 128-31, 135-36.
Also, the "check-the-box" system of entity classification outlined in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1,
—2, —3 reveals the trend with respect to taxpayer choice and flexibility in the role of legal status
generally. The regulations, which identify ,
 certain foreign and domestic entities as corporations
and permit the remainder to elect their classification for federal tax purposes, facilitate flexible
entity classification. 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,585 (1996).
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In the first case of separate, related corporations, legal status
prompts the expectation that the related party transactions will be
recognized. In fact, that result may be necessary to the extent that
significance attaches to the corporations' separate status, for example,
different accounting rules or jurisdictions (legal distinctions). But it is
the understanding of common ownership that tempers the recognition
of the related party transactions with the application of anti-abuse rules
(I.R.C. § 267, 482). The second case (consolidated groups), which
covers those situations in which common economic ownership may
play a more significant role than the separate legal status, permits the
separate legal status to be effectively ignored for some purposes. Fi-
nally, the third case (recognized branch transactions) reflects a differ-
ent combination of the factors. There, despite the absence of legally
separate entities, the existence of certain legal distinctions (for exam-
ple, jurisdiction) renders the branches' separateness more important
in trying to tax economic income and minimize distortions in taxpayer
behavior. Nonrecognition of interbranch transactions is neither funda-
mentally obvious given the complexity of factors acting upon the tax-
payers, nor required for consistency with the taxation of legally sepa-
rate taxpayers.' 87
But what of the hesitancy evident in recognizing interbranch trans-
actions? The analysis above describes the abuse potential as comparable
in both related party transactions and interbranch transactions and
proposes that similar anti-abuse rules could govern both. Are there
reasons, however, why we may trust our anti-abuse measures more in
the related party context? For example, although both cases involve
common economic ownership, if, as a practical matter, related but
separate companies have different managers and employees, there may
be some level of competitiveness, such as performance-based compen-
157
 It is interesting to note that the tax law seems to have done better with nonfinancial
groups. If a taxpayer either (1) produces inventory property in the United States and sells it in
a threign country, or (2) produces inventory property in a Wreign country and sells it in the
United States, then the income is considered partly from sources within the United States and
partly from sources outside. See Treas. Reg. § 1..863-3(b) (1) (1996). lit order w apply source
rules, the gross income must first be ;ilk rutted to production activities and to sales activities. After
that, the two categories ;111'e sourced according to special rules. The allocation of income between
production and sales activities is determined under one of several methods—including the
independent factory price (11 71'") method. Under the IFI' rule, if a producer regularly sells part
of its output to wholly independent distribillots and thereby demonstrates an independent factory
price, then that. IFP is used to establish it 'portion of gross sales 10 retail customers that is
allocated to production activities. Effectively, this rule can be understood as treating the domestic
manufacturing branch as if it were selling the goods to the foreign distribution branch at the
same price it sold to the unrelated distributor. See id. § 1.863-3(b) (2).
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sation, that "assists" in § 482's task of ensuring arm's length pricing in
related party contracts. This argument, however, is significantly under-
mined by the observation that the same dynamic occurs with branches
of a single legal entity competing to show their value.' 88 Nonetheless,
other regulatory and corporate reporting requirements may place
additional pressure on separate subsidiaries to more fairly report their
transactions. But if these mechanisms were very effective in controlling
abuse, we would not expect to see the volume of transfer pricing
disputes that currently exists.
B. U.S. Resistance to Recognizing Interbranch Contracts and
Risk-Shifting Within a Corporation
The taxation of U.S. branches of foreign corporations demon-
strates, perhaps most vividly, the inadequacy of the current U.S. posi-
tion on interbranch transactions.' 89 The absence of separate taxing
jurisdictions would substantially moot this issue because of the consoli-
dation-like effect it would have on interbranch transactions. That is,
the legal distinctions imposed here on branches (jurisdiction), which
do not rise to the level of creating separate legal status, would be
eliminated, leaving the economic and legal rules in greater harmony.
There would be one economic unit and there would be no legal
distinctions that were imposed but not fully integrated into the tax law.
The real world, however, has separate jurisdictions. In addition, the
United States takes its view on legal status seriously, at least in one
direction. The confusing result is that a U.S. branch is treated like a
separate entity in terms of the scope of U.S. taxation because jurisdic-
tion is primarily limited to the activities of the branch, but it is not
treated as a separate entity vis-a-vis its home office.
The response to the uneconomic results created by the U.S. rules
might be that it is acceptable for the corporation overall because where
the United States inappropriately taxes a branch gain, the foreign
country will probably tax the .home office on a net loss. 19° But this
1118 See infra text accompanying note 58.
11'9 Not surprisingly, the private bar has been active in advocating the use of the separate
entity method either broadly (see, e,g„ John A. Corry, NYSBA Reports on Foreign Interest Expense
Regulations, 92 TAX NOTES 39-31 (Sept. 23, 1992); Jack Wilson, Ernst (.9' Young Comments
on Foreign Banking Issues, 92 MX NOTES INT't. 64-3 (Nov. 4, 1992)) or at least for U.S. branches
on a limited basis (see, e.g., Stephen M. Brecher et al., Pea/ Marwick Clients Comment on Global
Trading of Financial Products and Potential Regulations, 91 TAX NOTES INT'1, 22-19 (May 22,
1991); Alfred C. Groff & James F. Hoch, Selected Issues in U.S. Thxation of U.S. Branches of Foreign
Banks, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 343, 569).
1 • 1) See supra text accompanying notes 85-102.
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analysis fails on several grounds. First, home country treatment might
not ameliorate the situation. Some countries might tax the corporation
on a worldwide basis, in which case there would be zero taxable income
recognized in the foreign country and a gain recognized by the United
States, despite the net zero economic effect. Second, many OECD
countries, even if taxing the home office on a territorial basis, would
recognize the interbranch transaction and thereby conclude that the
home office has zero taxable income. In that case as well, the corpo-
ration would pay net positive tax on net zero income.
Third, the premise underlying the U.S. taxation of the branch is
that the branch is engaging in a trade or business in the United States
and should be taxed on a net income basis with respect to its U.S.
operations. Effectively, the United States is recognizing the branch as
an operating business that is "independent" of the home office. As
discussed in detail below, viewing the branch as having net gain is not
accurate, regardless of whether the branch is specifically viewed as a
separate entity.
C. International Dialogue on the Interbranch Issue
The U.S. position on interbranch transactions contrasts with that
adopted by most OECD countries. The 1992 OECD Model Tax Con-
vention on Income and Capital ("1992 OECD Model Treaty") states in
the business profits article that:
there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that
permanent establishment the profits which it might be ex-
pected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or
similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the
enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.m
The Treaty Commentary explains that under its view of interbranch
transactions "the profits to be attributed to the permanent estab-
lishment are those which [it] would have made if instead of dealing
with its head office, it had been dealing with an entirely separate
enterprise under conditions and at prices prevailing in the ordinary
market."19" The commentary's approach explicitly reflects an "arm's
length principle," and anticipates that the use of arm's length alio-
191
 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Model Mx Convention on Income
and Capital., art. 7(2)' 191 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 OECD Model Treaty].
191 Commentary to 1992 OECD Model Treaty, art.. 7 1 11 (Mar. 1994).
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cations would extend beyond dealings with the head office to those
with other permanent establishments of the entity as well.'"
In 1984, the OECD conducted a study of the taxation of banking
and financial industries for which interbranch contracts are common
business practice. According to the study, the majority of OECD coun-
tries, with the exception of the United States and Japan, view foreign
bank branches as separate entities for purposes of interest expense
calculations.'" For example, they consider it necessary to take account
of intra-bank payments of interest in ascertaining arm's length profits
of bank branches in order to ensure that the taxation of the operating
profits of the foreign bank branch is consistent in principle with the
taxation of profits of other enterprises. Thus, the transactions between
the branch and the home office are recognized for tax purposes.
On the specific topic of interest, the 1992 OECD Model Treaty
Commentary reflects both the earlier OECD Model Treaty as well as
the 1984 study. First, the 1992 Model Commentary adopts the view of
the 1977 OECD Model Treaty, which permitted recognition of bank
interbranch interest payments. The 1977 Model Treaty concluded that,
although interest paid by a branch to its head office in return for funds
generally is not deductible in computing the branch's taxable profits,'"
"special considerations apply to payments of interest made by different
parts of a financial enterprise . . . to each other on advances etc. (as
distinct from capital allotted to them), in view of the fact that making
and receiving advances is closely related to the ordinary business of
such enterprises." 96 The commentary to the 1992 Model Treaty also
references the 1984 banking study of interbranch interest payments
and financial asset transactions and confirms that the Commentary
"does not depart from the positions expressed in the report on this
IS3
m The majority of OECD Member countries consider it necessary:
to take account of intra-bank payments of interest in ascertaining the arm's length
profits of a branch of a bank, in order to ensure that the taxation of the operating
profit of the foreign bank branch is consistent, in principle, with the taxation of
the profits of branches of other enterprises.
OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFA IRS, The Taxation of Multinational Banking Enterprises, in
TRANSFER PRICING AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES -THREE TAXATION ISSUES at 57 1 47
(1984). Their position is based on two points: (1) the language of the OECD Model Treaty, and
(2) the nature of banking business. See id. at 57. The United States and japan consider there to
be "no basis for requiring that intra-bank interest should be taken into account." Id. at 58 1 52.
195 See Commentary to 1992 OECD Model Maly, art. 7 1 18.3 (Mar. 1994) (noting the
continuation of prior treatment).
196 Id. 1 19 (repeating almost verbatim the language in the Commentary to the 1977 Model
Treaty, article 7).
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topic." I "7 Thus, although the OECD is sensitive to the special nature of
interest, it supports the recognition of interbranch contracts that re-
place or mirror third-party transactions.
The international community's focus on interbranch transactions
has been directed primarily towards banks and interest payments be-
cause banks operate in branch form and because they often engage in
interbranch transactions as if' they were third-party contracts. However,
the same observations that led to recognizing interbranch loans apply
to interbranch financial instruments. Correspondingly, a number of
countries have addressed the treatment of interbranch financial con-
tracts. For example, "Canada recognizes internal hedging transactions,
such as a swap between [a Canadian branch] and its head office,
provided their terms are based on arm's length principles."'" Simi-
larly, in Italy, "transactions between the [permanent establishment, i.e.,
branch] and its head office or other [permanent establishments] of
the same enterprise are relevant as though they were performed be-
tween distinct enterprises, . . . giving rise to actual costs and reve-
nues."'`'`' Other countries also recognize interbranch financial instru-
ment transactions. 20G
Against this backdrop, the U.S. tax rules produce arbitrary and
inconsistent results. The United States looks at the U.S. branch in
isolation and typically taxes only the activities of the branch. Thus, if
the hedging (either the interbranch hedge or the direct third-party
hedge by the home office) does not get on the "U.S. books," then the
branch will appear to have gain or loss for tax purposes. In contrast,
197 1d. The 11484 OECD banking report concluded that because the core nature of the
banking business is:
to borrow money outside the enterprise Mr the purpose of lending it outside the
enterprise, there is every reason to suppose that [most] money lent by [a] head
office to a branch and vice versa will in fact have been borrowed at some stage
from an independent third party and will be lent eventually to independent third
parties. TIUIS, the interest taken into account can be regarded as representing real
out-goings or receipts of the enterprise as a whole ....
OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, wpm note 194, at 57 I 49.
198
 Stephen R. Richardson & David G. Broadhurst, Canada, in TAX ASPECTS OF DERIVATIVE
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, CAIIIERS DE MUM' FISCAL INTERNATIONAL, VOL LXXXI). (1995) 119,
136. The same rule applies for fitreign branches of Canadian entities. See id.
199 FralICO Calefli & DOtnelliC0 Mtiralthi, Italy, in TAX ASPECTS OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS, CAIIIRRS n15 DROIT FISCAL. INTERNATIONAL, Vol. 1..XXXb (1995) 295, 321. To
prevent abuse, "the [Italian] regulation on transfer prices is applied to cross•border transactions
carried out between enterprises, whatever their . juridical form, that hold control relations (in-
cluding therefore, the transactions between head-oflice and [permanent establishment])." Id.
slxi See, e.g., Plambeck, .supra note 117, at 687 (Australia (for banks), Denmark, Sweden,
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland).
712	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:667
the home country will likely recognize the balanced position because
it accepts the interbranch transactions.
The U.S. response to the majority view of the OECD member
countries has taken several directions. First, the United States has
argued that the interpretation by the majority of OECD members of
the applicable treaty provisions as requiring, as opposed to simply
permitting, the separate entity approach and the recognition of intra-
bank transactions is too extreme and not required by the language of
the model treaty and commentary.m The United States maintains that
its treaties do not, as some taxpayers have claimed, require separate
entity treatment for branches, but simply make that an available op-
tion.202
201
 See generally Rev. Rul. 89-115, 1989-2 C.B. 130, 130-31; Rev. Rut. 85-7, 1985-7, 1985-1
C.B. 188, 188-89.
202 See id. The United States' new treaty with Mexico initially led some commentators to
speculate that the United States had begun to change its view on the calculation of business
profits. Article 7(3) of the new U.S. treaty with Mexico states:
However, no such deduction shall be allowed in respect of such amounts, if any,
paid (otherwise than towards reimbursement of actual expenses) by the permanent
establishment to the home office of the enterprise or any of its other offices by way
of royalties, fees or other rights, by way of commission for specific services per-
formed or for management, or except in the case of a banking enterprise, by way
of interest on moneys lent to the permanent establishment.
See James E. Croker, Jr., Editorial: Possible Inconsistency Between U.S. -Mexico Treaty and Section
1.882-5 Regulations, 92 TAX NOTES Isret. 67-16 (Nov. 9, 1992). This provision, if read literally,
would appear to permit U.S. branches of a Mexican bank to deduct interest paid on a loan from
the home office. See id. However, as one commentator noted, this reading of the treaty would
make it inconsistent with the United States' position under (then) Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5
which viewed interest as fungible and used a formula to determine the interest expense attribut-
able to a U.S. branch of a foreign corporation. See id.
This potential conflict raised the possibility that acceptance of the separate entity method
for banks in the U.S.-Mexico Treaty was intentional and was simply another unusual feature of
that treaty. However, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the Mexico Treaty
stated that:
[t] he Treasury Department has infbrined the Committee that, with regard to the
above exception for banking enterprises [Art. 7], the proposed treaty is not in-
tended to expand the allowable deductions for interest by a foreign bank operating
in the United States beyond the deductions that are available under domestic U.S.
law (currently provided by Trea,s. Reg. § 1.882-5). As indicated above, intracom-
pany bank interest would be an exception to the proposed treaty's general preclu-
sion of deductions for intracompany interest payments. Either country, under its
respective internal laws, could, but is not required to, grant a deduction for interest
paid on actual intracompany transactions. Rather than allowing deductions for such
actual payments, the tax law of the United States determines the amount of deduct-
ible interest expense of a U.S. branch under the above cited regulations.
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report on the 1992 U.S. -Mexico Income Tax Treaty and
Protocol, Exec. Rep. 103-20, 93 TAX NOTES 1O1)AY 241-42 (Nov. 26, 1993) (footnote omitted).
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Second, with respect to interbranch interest, the United States has
argued that its rules for determining the interest deduction available
to foreign bank branches in the United States are consistent with its
treaty obligations. Although the method for calculating the allowable
interest deduction for a foreign bank's U.S. branch changed with the
promulgation of new regulations in 1996, both the new and old regu-
lations use a three step formula. 20' First, the branch must determine
the total value of all assets which generate income effectively con-
nected with the conduct of the trade or business of the U.S. branch.
Second, the branch must determine the amount of liabilities con-
nected with its U.S. trade or business. This amount, however, is not an
actual amount. It is calculated by multiplying the assets determined in
the first step by either a fixed ratio of ninety-three percent for banks,
or the actual worldwide liability to asset ratio of the entity. After having
determined the total value of the U.S.-connected assets and liabilities,
the final step involves calculation of the permitted interest deduc-
tion.'" On several occasions, the Service has ruled that the formula
adequately compensates for the problems of taxing the branch on its
net income while ignoring interbranch contracts. 205 The Service also
maintains that application of the allocation formula is consistent,with
the principles articulated in its tax treaties that require permanent
establishments or branches of foreign corporations to be taxed as
distinct and separate enterprises. 206
Although this allocation method may produce more reasonable
results than an approach that counted only existing third-party con-
tracts entered into by the branch, it involves a formula based on factors
other than the actual loans, liabilities, and interest rates of the branch
and does not recognize the infra-bank transactions. 207 Nonetheless, in
the preamble to these new interest allocation rules, the Treasury and
203 See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5 (1996). The new regulations were promulgated on March 5,
1996.
2°4 1n this regard, the taxpayer has a choice between two methods: (1) the "adjusted U.S.-
booked liabilities method," which uses a comparison of the branch's book liabilities (actual) and
its liabilities calculated under step 2 (formula); and (2) the separate currency pools method which
groups U.S. assets into different currency pools to determine liabilities and then uses worldwide
interest rate averages for each pool. See Treas. Reg. § 1.882-5.
205 See, e.g., Rev. Rul, 89-115, 1989-2 C.B. 130, 130-31; Rev. Rul, 85-7, 1985-1 C.B. 188,
188-89.
206 See id. It is unclear whether the United States' position that its allocation formula for
interest payments by bank branches of foreign entities is, in fact, consistent with its treaty
obligations.
t' 7 This formulary method raises a number of administrative concerns regarding the
ficulty of obtaining data on a worldwide basis and has made the government hesitant to replace
the arm's length approach with a formulary method of apportioning income. These concerns
714	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:667
the Service reiterated their belief that the allocation method is entirely
consistent with treaty obligations.2 °8 This position, however, may soon
be tested in the courts. In 1995, a British bank filed a suit claiming that
the business profits article of the U.K.-U.S. treaty permits a U.S. per-
manent establishment of a U.K. entity to calculate interest expense as
if it were a separate entity. 20°
Finally, the United States has argued that its position on intra-bank
interest payments is consistent with its general rules regarding the tax
effect given transactions between different parts of the same entity.
Taken literally, the U.S. position is correct to the extent that it claims
to be consistent with the general view on nonrecognition of intra-tax-
payer transactions. However, the analysis should not end there because
the United States has not been consistent in applying this "general
view," and because a different approach may be required in the case
of bank branches operating in foreign countries.
As discussed in Part I, financial entities frequently operate in
foreign countries in branch form, and often engage in interbranch
instead of third-party transactions. Thus, sensible branch rules are
necessary. Given that the United States is only taxing the profits attrib-
utable to the branch, in some basic sense it must look at the branch
as an entity distinct from the rest of the corporation. This intuitive
understanding can be expressed in more analytical terms. Although
the branch does not have independent legal status, and is part of a
single corporation with the home office, U.S. tax law draws certain
legal distinctions between the branch and home office. In the cross-
border context, the key distinctions are jurisdiction based; the United
States can tax the branch, but not the home office, on a net basis.
To tax the branch fairly, the U.S. rules must account for the impact
of these legal distinctions. Because of the scope of U.S. taxing jurisdic-
have led the New York State Bar Association to recommend that the fungibility approach be
elective. See NYSBA Report on I oposed Section 1.882-5 Aug. 26, 1992, 92 TAX Noms 1 NT I. 39-31
(Sept. 23, 1992). The AL1 recommended a trading approach over a formulary one as its general
rule for allocating deductions to the activities of a U.S. branch because of the administrative
burden a formulary method places on the taxpayer to provide data and on the government to
verify the information. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL. INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTER-
NATIONAL ASPECTS Or UNITED STATES 1NCOME TAXATION 117 (1987).
255 Preamble to Final Treasury Regulations § 1.882-5, 61 Fed. Reg. 9326 (1996) ("The IRS
and the Treasury Department believe that the methodology provided in these regulations is fully
consistent with all or the United States' treaty obligations, including the Business Profits article
of our tax treaties.").
2"9 See Robert A. Katcher & Gary R. Vogel, Interest Expense Allocation for Foreign Corporations:
A Continuing Source of Discontent?, 12 TAX NOTES INT'L 1551, 1553 (May 13, 1996) (describing
the complaint tiled in National Westminster Bank PLC v. United States, No. 95-758T (Fed. Cl.
complaint filed Nov. 17, 1995)).
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tion, it matters whether the branch or home office engages in a trans-
action. Thus, interbranch transactions are critical for locating income,
gain, loss or deduction in the correct place. To the extent the United
States fears abuse in the pricing of interest payments on interbranch
loans, the concerns parallel those raised by parent-subsidiary transac-
tions. In such cases, the United States recognizes the transactions and
requires the transfer pricing between parent and subsidiary to be in
conformity with market principles. The same principles could be ex-
tended to the recognition of intra-bank transactions. 21 °
Perhaps of greater significance in evaluating the U.S. consistency
regarding intra-taxpayer transactions is the fact that the United States
explicitly treats U.S. branches of foreign entities as separate entities for
its own purposes. 2 " In addition to the basic income tax imposed on
profits earned by a U.S. branch, the United States imposes a branch
profits tax on foreign corporations engaged in a U.S. business. 212 The
branch profits tax is equal to thirty percent of the "dividend equivalent
amount" for the taxable year.213
 The dividend equivalent amount is the
"effectively connected earnings and profits for the taxable year" as
adjusted by the statute, which can be roughly characterized as the U.S.
branch's earnings that are not reinvested in the United States. 2 "
The purpose of the branch profits tax is to equalize the incentive
of a foreign entity to conduct business in the United States in branch
versus subsidiary form.215
 The provision seeks to accomplish this by
achieving "greater parity between the remittance of [a foreign corpo-
ration's U.S.] branch profits and the distribution of [a U.S.] subsidi-
ary['s] earnings." 216
 If a foreign corporation engages in business in the
United States through a subsidiary, the subsidiary would be subject to
U.S. income tax on its earnings. The foreign parent then would be
subject to U.S. tax on dividends paid by the U.S. subsidiary. If a foreign
corporation operates in the United States through a branch, however,
the foreign corporation is subject to tax on the U.S. branch's U.S.
business profits, but no additional tax is imposed when those profits
21 ° See infra Part 1V for a discussion of the range of possible alternatives.
211 See generally Brown, supra note 7, at 194; Reich, ,supra note 7.
212 See I.R.G. § 884(b) (1) (1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.884-1(b) (1996).
213 See I.R.C. § 884(a), (b).
2 " The first adjustment to earnings and profits is a reduction for the increase, if any, in U.S.
net equity, i.e., investment in the United States. Certain other adjustments arc also made under
the applicable regulations. See Treas. Reg. § (b) (2), (3).
215 See H.R. Corry. REP. No. 99-841, at 11-647 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4075,
4735.
21 s„
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are remitted or sent back to the home office.217
 For that reason, the
branch profits tax was imposed to compensate for the fact that branches
could otherwise remit funds to their home office free of an additional
layer of tax.
By imposing the branch profits tax, the United States has implic-
itly recognized branches as entities separate from the home office. 218
Obviously, the United States does not consider legal status as a separate
entity to be the sole criterion in tax. 219 Rather, in complex situations in
which there is not only legal status to consider but also legal distinc-
tions, a different compromise must be reached to accommodate the
competing goals. The branch profits tax serves as such a bridge in the
effort to coordinate tax objectives in a case in which legal status sug-
gests different treatment for branches and subsidiaries, but the legal
distinctions of jurisdiction prompt more comparable treatment. It is
relevant to note that the branch profits tax was not conceived of as a
penalty or response to abuse by taxpayers. The goal of the tax was to
eliminate the difference between separately incorporating a U.S. busi-
ness of a foreign corporation and maintaining it as a branch. 22° Cer-
tainly, such an explicit and sweeping intention on the part of the
217 Under certain conditions, the United States does treat a subsequent dividend by the
foreign corporation to its shareholder as U.S. source, and thus subject to U.S. tax. Specifically, if
25% or more of the foreign corporation's gross income "for the 3-year period ending with the
close of its taxable year preceding" was effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business, then
a proportionate share of the dividend is considered U.S. source. 1.R.C. § 861(a) (2) (B) (1996).
This rule, however, poses difficulties to enforcement.
See I.R.C. § 884(a) (1996); see also Brown, supra note 7, at 194.
219 The tax treatment contemplated for the reverse case, a U.S. corporation with a foreign
branch, demonstrates the range of branch rules Congress has been willing to consider. The 1954
Code passed by the House included a provision permitting a U.S. corporation to elect to defer
income earned by a foreign branch until the income was withdrawn from the branch. See, e.g.,
Brown, supra note 7, at 159 n.146 (citing H.R. Rap. No. 83-1337, at 259-65 (1954)). The purpose,
as with the branch profits tax today, was to achieve parity in the treatment of subsidiaries and
branches-in this case between U.S. corporations and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. See
id. As part of this deferral, the branch income was to be separately calculated and interbranch
transactions recognized. See id. For reasons concerning a related provision, however, this branch
rule was not included in the Senate bill, and ultimately, both provisions were dropped in
Conference Committee. See id. (citing S. Rae. No. 83-1622, at 105 (1954) reprinted in 2 U.S.
Revenue Acts, 1954 Legislative History & Congressional Documents; H.R. Rep. No. 83-2543, at
68-69 (1954), reprinted in 2 U.S. Revenue Acts, 1954 Legislative History & Congressional Docu-
ments).
220 In addition to the branch profits tax, the United States imposes a branch level interest
tax that requires a foreign corporation to pay tax on certain amounts of "excess" interest that its
branch pays. This arises in certain situations in which the branch is permitted a deduction for
interest payments and the foreign home office is subject to tax as if it were the recipient of the
interest, See I.R.C, § 884(f) (1996).
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United States to view and to tax branches like subsidiaries cannot be
dismissed as a minor inconsistency. Instead, it is a powerful example
of the real similarity between branches and subsidiaries, as well as the
government's comfort level in adopting that position.
Certain provisions in the foreign currency transaction rules also
treat branches as having a role separate from the home office (or other
branches) . 221 First, the core concept in the foreign currency regime of
"functional currency" (the primary currency in which the business is
conducted) is determined not on a corporation-wide basis, but on a
business unit-(i.e., branch) by-business unit basis. 222 Second, even though
the foreign currency rules generally do not recognize interbranch
transactions, they do recognize transfers that change the functional
currency of an item.'" If a French branch transfers a yen liability to a
Tokyo branch, the transaction may be recognized by the foreign cur-
rency rules.224
 The provisions can be understood as an effort to incor-
porate the effect of both economics (common ownership) and legal
distinctions (functional currency).
In addition to using the independent status of branches in the
branch profits tax and foreign currency rules, the Code has looked
beyond strict legal status in other provisions. For example, regulated
investment companies ("RICs"), 225
 which pursuant to a special regime
are generally taxed as pass-through entities, 226
 are permitted to engage
in recognized self-dealing. If an investment company that qualifies as
an RIC wants to offer several different funds with different investment
strategies, it has a choice. First, it can set up a separate RIC for each
fund. Alternatively, it can form a series fund, a single corporation
comprising multiple funds with separate classes of beneficial owner-
ship that effectively allow investors to own the fund of their choice. 227
The series fund approach can be preferable because of savings in
221 See id. §§ 985-989 (1996).
222 See id. § 985 (b) (1).
223
 See Treas. Reg. § 1.988-1(a) (10) (ii) (1992).
224 See id.
225 RIGS are domestic corporations or business trusts registered as investment companies with
the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Company Act of 1940, that make
an election and satisfy asset and income tests. See I.R.C. § 851(a), (b) (1996),
226 Qualifying RICs can deduct the amount of ordinary dividends paid from the calculation
of investment company taxable income. See id. § 852(b) (2) (1996).
227 See id. § 851(h) (2) (defining a series fund as a "segregated portfolio of assets, the bene-
ficial interests in which are owned by the holders of a class or series of stock of the regulated
investment company that is preferred over all other classes or series in respect of such portfolio
of assets").
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formation costs, shareholder report preparation costs, filing fees, di-
rectors' fees, custody fees, and auditor fees.228 Each fund is considered
a separate corporation for tax purposes, thus, transactions between
funds of a single RIC constitute recognized, taxable events.229
The parallel between an RIC series fund whose different funds
deal with each other and a corporation whose foreign branch and
home office engage in interbranch transactions is twofold. On a simple
level, both involve a single legal entity whose subdivisions engage in
transactions with each other as if they were third parties. The accep-
tance of these transactions within the RIC is another example of legal
status not being determinative of tax treatment. On a more complex
level, the recognition of RIC interfund transactions can be understood
as a balance between the factors of legal status and economic owner-
ship. Legal status would dictate non-recognition for these interfund
contracts because the RIC is a single corporation. However, economic
ownership points in the other direction. The fact that an RIC series
fund can have different shareholders owning the different funds means
the RIC lacks the common economic ownership that usually bars the
recognition of intra-taxpayer transactions. In this balance of legal status
and economic ownership, the factors support allowance of inter-fund
con tracts.
Similarly, in the context of interbranch contracts, a balance of
different factors supports recognition. The central issue in the taxation
of interbranch transactions (as well as related party transactions) is the
integration of the three factors: legal status (incorporation), economic
ownership, and legal distinctions (e.g., source and jurisdiction, ac-
counting method, and functional currency). With respect to inter-
branch transactions, although the first two factors often appear to
support nonrecognition, the last factor, legal distinctions, can be strong
enough to require that interbranch transactions be recognized. Thus,
an understanding of the treatment of RICs, which demonstrates that
legal status is not determinative and that the tax system has the ability
to assess the relative importance of each factor in a given• case, offers
225 See Richard M. Hervey, Taxation of Regulated Investment Companies, 740 Tax Mgmt. (BNA)
at A-107 (1995).
229 See I.R.C. § 851(h) (1). Prior to 1986 when § 851(h) was added to the Code, a series
corporation was considered a single taxpayer and no gain or loss was realized on the transfer for
cash of securities from one portfolio (fund) in the corporation to another. See Union Trusteed
Funds, Inc, v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1133, 1137 (1947) (single entity treatment), acq, in result,
1947-2 C.B. 4; Rev. Rid. 56-246, 1956-1 C.B. 316 (asset transfers), declared obsolete in Rev. Rul.
88-14, 1988-1 C.B, 405 (due to the enactment of § 851(q))•
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an additional perspective on the analysis of risk-shifting through inter-
branch contracts.
D. Observations from the Comparison
The comparison between interbranch and related party transac-
tions illustrates some general points as well as some specific observa-
tions. First, although the United States does have a principle, based in
part on common sense, that a taxpayer cannot contract with itself, the
position is not absolute. The principle is not strictly followed because
it emphasizes only one of three relevant factors (legal status) and
ignores the other two (legal distinctions and economic ownership).
The basic related party rule reflects acceptance of legal status as a key
factor, but acknowledges the importance of common economic own-
ership through its reliance on anti-abuse provisions such as §§ 267 and
482 of the I.R.C.
Consolidated group hedging rules display an even more sensitive
(though still limited) approach. Where common economic ownership
seems to dominate legal status and/or legal distinctions, the consoli-
dated group is treated as a single corporation and a third-party position
held by one member of the group can be hedged for tax purposes by
another member. If legal status and legal distinctions seem to weigh
heavily, however, the member's separateness is emphasized and any
inter-member hedging contracts are recognized under the separate
entity election.
Interbranch contracts raise the same questions. The only differ-
ence is how the factors balance. Instead of legal status supporting
recognition of interbranch transactions, it is the importance of the
legal distinctions which compels adequate attention to interbranch
contracts.
IV. ALTERNATIVE TAX TREATMENTS FOR RISK-SHIFTING
WITHIN A CORPORATION
As the technical review of current law in Parts I and II and the
legal analysis in Part III demonstrate, the tax system struggles in its
effort to tax risk-shifting appropriately within a single corporation.
Better rules are essential for businesses that frequently rely on inter-
branch transactions to conduct business, such as financial entities
using interbranch hedges. The tremendous increase in the globaliza-
tion of financial markets has expanded the role of financial interme-
diaries and the volume of their transactions. Under such circumstances,
tolerance for uneconomic taxation of branch income is limited and
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the scale of the problem is increasing. What is needed are tax rules on
risk-shifting that do not change taxpayer behavior and do not create a
tax effect for transactions (such as hedges) that have a net zero eco-
nomic impact. The analysis in Part III sought to examine why the
current rules are inadequate and how the tax rules for related party
risk-shifting manage comparable tensions. The analysis ultimately fo-
cused on three factors—legal status, legal distinctions, and economic
ownership—and reviewed their relationship.
Part IV begins by building on the determination that complete
dependence on legal status as a fundamental tax principle fails to
incorporate the incentives and economic realities of common owner-
ship and the impact of legal distinctions. The U.S. tax system has
demonstrated the most flexibility in coordinating these factors in the
treatment of separately incorporated related parties, by providing sin-
gle and separate entity hedging regimes for consolidated groups. Treat-
ing members of a consolidated group as divisions of a single corpora-
tion reduces reliance on legal status and implements rules that better
reflect taxable income and underlying activity."° The related party
cases highlight some elements useful in assessing alternative branch
tax rules, including: willingness to look beyond formal status, use of
anti-abuse rules, reporting requirements, limited scope for new rules,
and the acknowledgment of dual relationships (e.g., in the parent-sub-
sidiary context some interactions and transfers, such as dividends and
contributions to capital, reflect the shareholder-corporation relation-
ship while others are essentially equivalent to third-party transactions).
Part IV synthesizes the observations developed in Parts I, II and
III into recommendations for new branch rules. Given the virtual
inevitability of legal distinctions such as jurisdiction, and their impact
on domestic and foreign taxpayers, issues of branch taxation and
internal risk-shifting must be resolved. Success is measured by identi-
fying rules that have minimal impact on taxpayer behavior and that do
a better job of reconciling the three factors than the current rules.
"Economic ownership, however, is not an all or nothing factor and these examples raise
additional questions about where to draw the ownership line in rules that rely on this factor. For
example, the consolidated group rules operate on a defined set of taxpayers, those constituting
a consolidated group with 80% or more common ownership. Given that the degree of common
ownership and its relevance moves along a sliding scale, starting with 100% common ownership
(e.g., parent and subsidiary) and moving down, the task is to determine how to incorporate the
basic factor into a specific rule, such as the level of common ownership needed to qualify for
consolidation. The intangible and imprecise nature of the economic ownership fitctor is perhaps
better reflected in the allocation and pricing rules of § 482 of the I.R.C., which speak in terms
of "control," a term defined broadly in the regulations. I.R.C. § 482 (1996); Treas. Reg. fi 1.482—
1(i)(4), (5) (1994).
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Explicit recognition of interbranch transactions is viewed as a likely but
not exclusive recommendation because this paper seeks a full analysis
of the taxation of risk-shifting.
The question, therefore, is what alternatives can and should the
United States consider for branch taxation. At least six possibilities can
be outlined, which differ on several levels, including: (1) scope of
coverage, (2) process used, (3) role of the taxpayer in obtaining the
tax treatment, (4) degree of interaction with other countries, (5) cost
of obtaining the treatment, (6) degree of remaining uncertainty and
risk for both the taxpayer and the government, and (7) permanence
of the rule. Each of the possible approaches is explained and evaluated
below in sections A through F. Finally, in section G, their comparative
advantages are considered.
A. Individualized Taxation: Advance Pricing Agreements
The absence of an immediate regulatory response to the problem-
atic taxation of interbranch transactions has pushed taxpayers towards
less direct resolutions. Having failed to persuade the United States to
change its policy or "reinterpret" its treaties, taxpayers have sought
other avenues toward the same results. The primary mechanism has
been the use of APAs. The APA procedure was formally introduced in
1991.231 The procedure permits a multinational taxpayer to approach
the Service (and other countries simultaneously) and develop an in-
tercompany pricing and cost sharing methodology that will be applied
prospectively (and in some cases, retrospectively) to its transactions. 2"
The procedure was an outgrowth of increasing audits and litigation
over transfer pricing under § 482 of the and was intended to
limit audit risks and costs for both the government and taxpayers. If
the taxpayer complies with the terms of its negotiated APA and pro-
vides the supporting documentation during the period for which the
APA applies, then the Service's audit of the transactions will be more
limited in scope.
Although the APA process was not specifically designed to medi-
ate interbranch tax issues, a number of major financial entities have
sought or are seeking APAs, in part to deal with problems caused by
the U.S. position on interbranch contracts. The initial wave of APAs
confronting the interbranch issue resolved it through a negotiated
231 See Rev. Proc. 91-22,1991-1 C.B. 526,527,
23` The Service recently issued Rev. Proc. 96-53,1996-49 	 9-20, which supersedes Rev.
Proc. 91-22 and updates the procedures for obtaining an APA.
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formulary method of attributing income and expense to the various
operations of the taxpayer."' Interbranch transactions were not explic-
itly recognized, but were accounted for by trying to reflect the value
attributable to that segment of the corporation."' The Service has since
determined that it has the authority to recognize interbranch transac-
tions pursuant to the mutual agreement provisions of its income tax
treaties. 235 The first APA directly covering the taxation of cross-border
interbranch transactions was completed in early 1995. 238 In the absence
of a treaty, however, there is no basis for recognizing interbranch
contracts because the authority for such APAs derives from treaty
provisions. 237
Under the current tax regime, APAs are the only framework for
recognizing interbranch transactions, and even then only in a limited
context. The taxpayer must be engaged in cross-border transactions in
a treaty country, and the Service (and other countries) must agree to
the methodology proposed by the taxpayer. Certainly, for taxpayers
facing significant interbranch issues, obtaining an APA is a valid and
serious alternative. The question, however, from a systemic point of
view is whether this "solution" is adequate. If it is, then the Service
could follow its current course which would allow it to maintain its
formal position of nonrecognition of branch transactions while gradu-
ally gaining detailed information about business interbranch practices.
To the extent that most of the interbranch-motivated APAs involve
financial institutions, the Service may be able to devise a satisfactory
standardized procedure for the industry. 238
Pursuing a more process-oriented approach, like APAs, may be
desirable on strategic grounds. If the United States were to adopt new
substantive branch tax rules unilaterally, it would forego the opportu-
233 See Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.R. 351, 352 (general guidance for submitting APA requests
regarding global trading).
234 See id.
235 See First APA Covering Cross-Border, Interbranch Bank Transactions Concluded, 1995 DAILY
TAX REP. at 45, d3 (March 8, 1995) (the use of APAs for interbranch transactions became possible
when, in 1994, the Service concluded that it had the authority to do so pursuant to its treaties).
236 See id. (noting that the Service had concluded its first APA for the allocation of income
from interbranch financial products transactions).
237 See id.
238 See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 94-40, 1994-1 C.B. 351, 352 (providing a summary and review
of APAs for global trading operations); see also Bilateral APA for Interbranch Foreign Exchange
Transaction, 66 TAX NOTES 1607 (March 13, 1995) (noting that the Director of the Service's APA
program indicated that the next step would be to release "general guidance for submitting APA
requests" on interbranch contracts, similar to the guidance provided in Notice 99-40).
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nity to gain something in return through a negotiated procedure, such
as an APA or treaty. The same argument has been made in favor of
keeping the statutory withholding rate on dividends and royalties at
thirty percent and relying on treaty negotiation to provide a lower
rate. 23" However, even if such a strategic opportunity were lost by a
decision to take a substantive route on interbranch contracts, there
might be a significant difference between using this leverage argument
for withholding rates and using it for substantive questions of tax law
that directly impact the taxation of economic income. Moreover, re-
duction of withholding rates is more clearly a direct revenue loser for
the United States for which it would like an offSetting concession.
Conversely, improving the interbranch statutory rules would, in many
cases, simply decrease the random nature of taxable gains and losses
from hedging transactions in comparison to the economic gains and
losses.
Unfortunately, the APA solution is not an institutional response to
a problem with the tax law, but rather an alternative by which a
taxpayer can achieve a result different from the one prescribed by
current law. The taxpayer must undertake the intensive APA process
in order to resolve what here is argued to be arbitrary tax treatment
of interbranch transactions. Although compelling interim needs may
make this approach currently necessary from both the government
and taxpayer perspectives, we should not be satisfied with this as a
permanent resolution of the interbranch question. Regardless of the
basic concerns over APAs (including their private law nature and
limited availability), we should be hesitant to allow the flexibility avail-
able through these contracts to justify not confronting problems with
the substantive law.'" Moreover, although APAs may be a good device
for monitoring smaller numbers of taxpayers, large scale application
of the APA process may be more limited.
2" See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL As-
PEcTs OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION II. 13 (1992). Noting that:
!mine tax administrators have explicitly acknowledged the practice of inlopting
domestic law rules designed to he modified by treaty (most frequently by imposing
withholding tax rates higher than deemed appropriate in order to use a reduction
in those rates as a "bargaining chip" to bring potential treaty parties to the negoti-
ating table.
Id.
2`"' See, e.g., Mike McIntyre, The Case For Public Disclosure of Advance flutings on Transfer
Miring Methodologies, 91 TAx NOTES 2-27 (Jan. 9, 1991) (describing various drawbacks of
the APA process).
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B. Tracing Third-party Contracts
To the extent the United States considers making substantive law
changes to branch taxation, a range of options are available. The
most conservative new rule would follow a tracing approach. Branches
would be allowed to treat as their own transactions those third-party
contracts entered into by the home office (or other branch) that were
identified as entered into on behalf of the branch. Essentially, the
home office (or other branch) would operate as an agent for the
branch. A tracing method differs from a strict separate entity approach
because it does not incorporate a profit eiement. 24 ' For example, in
determining expense deductions for a U.S. branch of a foreign corpo-
ration, tracing would impute a charge to the branch equal to the cost
of expenses, whereas separate entity treatment would include a profit
element in the charge.242
Unlike the use of APAs, this approach relies on the tax law to
confront the problem and propose a universal solution. But in theory
and practice it proves to be a limited approach. First, it is unclear how
one part of a single taxpayer can be an agent for another part of the
taxpayer in a regime that does not acknowledge any significant inde-
pendent function of branches in the tax law. It may be necessary in
this line of argument to envision the "agency" idea as a shorthand for
identifying what is "allocable" to branch activities, that is, identifying
which contracts should be on the branch's books.
Second, and more importantly, this method only works to the
extent that discrete home office contracts with third parties corre-
spond to branch activities (and there is no net hedging). Typically, it
may not be theoretically accurate nor administratively feasible to match
interbranch and third-party contracts on a one-for-one basis. 243 To rely
241 See generally Commentary to 1992 OECD Model Treaty, art. (7)(2) 11 17, 17.1 (March
1994) (noting that the treatment of the profit element is the major difference between the
provisions of the Model providing for recognition of interbranch transactions and those that
permit tracing).
212 See, e.g., brown, supra note 7, at 172 (describing the different treatment of profits under
tracing and separate entity approaches).
'243 A related observation has been made in the context of § 475 of the I.R.C. regarding the
taxation of dealers, There it has been noted that a "banking unit hedges its aggregate risk by
transferring it to the derivative dealer unit by means of an interdivisional hedging transaction"
and that the "dealer unit does not generally hedge the banking unit's risk by entering into specific
third-party contracts .... Instead the dealer unit aggregates the banking unit's risk with [others]
and hedges only the resulting net risk." Letter to Treasury from Thomas A. Stout, Jr. dated Sept.
15, 1994, reprinted in 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-33 (Oct. 27, 1994) (citing H.R. CONE. REP No.
103-213, at 615 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.CA.N. 1058, 1304, which acknowledged that
taxpayers with such a hedging strategy often use accounting systems that clearly identify these
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on a tracing rule to gain recognition of interbranch contracts, taxpay-
ers would need to modify their business practices and facilitate one-
for-one matching by eliminating any net hedging and maintaining a
record of the correlation. Tracing meets certain tax goals by quantify-
ing the activity of the different branches of an entity, thereby providing
a more accurate measure of taxable income. Its limited proxy function,
however, increases transaction costs by modifying business behavior
and by reducing the effectiveness and realistic availability of such a
rule.
C. Limited Recognition of interbranch Contracts
Another approach for addressing the interbranch issue through
changes in the tax law would be to recognize a limited class of inter-
branch contracts. The most likely class would be interbranch contracts
of financial institutions, because of these taxpayers' extensive use of
the branch form and interbranch contracts. The shift to this rule would
signal that legal status is not the only factor and that legal distinctions
and economic ownership are also significant. Unlike a tracing rule, it
would send this signal more effectively by actually recognizing the
interbranch contract. In addition, it would make the relief more read-
ily available by directly using the interbranch contracts, rather than
using a proxy that is imperfect due to its limited correlation to the
interbranch contracts.
What needs to be explained and justified is the limited scope of
such a rule. Why recognize some interbranch contracts, but not all?
Why the contracts of financial institutions but not other taxpayers?
Clearly it is a "partial" solution which draws lines not required by the
analysis of the three factors underlying these transactions (legal status,
legal distinctions, and economic ownership). The rationale for offering
a limited interbranch method is that it responds to administrative and
implementation concerns by initiating change in a more controlled
environment. The approach shares some of the appeal of the APA
method, which is praised as a mechanism that allows the Service to
move more slowly and gather information by negotiating branch rules
on a case-by-case basis. Both the limited recognition rule and the APA
transactions between the business units and handle them like transactions between unrelated
parties). Based on this picture, it has beers proposed that a portion of the dealer hedge with third
parties be considered the hedge of the banking unit and that this can he achieved by relying on
the amount of income or loss the banking unit should recognize from the interbranch hedge.
See id.
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process offer the U.S. tax system some protection against interbranch
abuse in unanticipated contexts.
This same virtue may pose a problem as well because it requires
identification of a clear rationale for limiting the scope to financial
institutions. Applying the rule to only financial institutions can be
justified by focusing on taxpayer need, risk containment, and admin-
istrative concerns. As discussed earlier, financial institutions frequently
operate in branch form and often engage in interbranch transactions
as part of their regular business patterns. To the extent the failure to
recognize interbranch contracts and internal risk-shifting results in
serious distortions in taxable income and taxpayer behavior, any solu-
tion should be directed first toward those taxpayers who bear the brunt
of the problem. Of course, restricting the rule to financial institutions
puts pressure on the definition of such entities. Taxpayers seeking
recognition of interbranch transactions might strive to characterize
themselves as within the scope of qualified entities. Classification of
taxpayers and the problems it poses are not new, however, and should
not be a major barrier to considering a limited recognition rule.
Initial reliance on a limited recognition rule for financial entities
can also be supported by the desire to contain risk and to facilitate
successful implementation of the rule. Any unanticipated risks that the
government may face by changing its position on branch transactions
without the benefit of ex ante individualized review (as in APAs) is
minimized by the composition and limited size of the pool of taxpayers
able to avail themselves of the new rule. The government, which has
been gathering APA information on interbranch contracts of financial
entities, would have the opportunity to see the ramifications of a
recognition rule play out among the financial institutions before intro-
ducing the rule to taxpayers generally. Such a "contained" approach
eases the government's administrative burden. The volume and variety
of taxpayers to be evaluated under the limited recognition rule are less
than that which would result from a broader introduction of inter-
branch contract recognition.
Characterizing and justifying a limited recognition rule in this way
indicates that ideally its status is temporary and that when the govern-
ment has gained sufficient experience to satisfy concerns regarding
unanticipated impacts, the scope of recognized interbranch transac-
tions would be broadened. Although this is a plausible path, the ne-
cessity of pursuing the intermediate course of a limited recognition
rule may be negated by the existing APA process. To the extent the
current use of APAs among financial entities (as well as other taxpay-
ers) has already provided the Service with significant data on inter-
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branch transactions and risk-shifting within a corporation, it may have
served the function of a limited recognition rule. In that case, little
additional benefit might be gained by taking an interim step, unless
the Service believes that for reasons of administrability, the potential
risks can be contained only by limited application.'"
D. General Recognition of Interbranch Contracts
The prior alternatives have been described against the backdrop
of the "ultimate" rule that could be adopted: general statutory recog-
nition of interbranch contracts.'" The rationale for broad recognition
of interbranch contracts is the same one that motivates the first three
approaches described: a determination that the current tax system's
almost exclusive reliance on legal status with respect to interbranch
contracts fails to adequately address the impact of legal distinctions,
and thus produces distortions in taxable income. Taking the recogni-
tion of interbranch transactions, this extra step eliminates the issues
raised with the third approach (limited recognition rule) regarding its
more narrow scope.
General recognition, however, raises the specter of unanticipated
abuses. The problem may be most serious in cases where interbranch
contracts are not regularly used and thus have not been explored yet
in an APA negotiation. For example, if most APA interbranch discus-
sions have involved financial entities whose regular business structure
includes interbranch contracts, then the APAs may not have gathered
sufficient information about the use of interbranch contracts in other
settings. This observation, however, does not necessarily guide the
choice of rule here. First, it assumes that there is in fact a serious
difference in the potential abuse of interbranch contracts in nonfinan-
cial settings. But if there are ways in which interbranch contracts can
be used inappropriately, financial entities are just as capable of making
that discovery. Moreover, it would be easier for a taxpayer with many
valid interbranch contracts (such as a financial entity) to disguise an
inappropriate one, than it would be for a taxpayer that engages in the
transactions less frequently.
In addition, if a limited recognition rule is considered preferable,
in part because it offers the Service more time to study the use of
244
 The one additional benefit from adopting a limited recognition rule would relate to cost.
Any taxpayer entering into APA negotiations solely to obtain recognition of interbranch contracts
would find a statutory recognition rule a much cheaper route.
245 See generally Brown, supra note 7, at 136 (advocating application of the separate entity
approach only to U.S. branches of foreign corporations).
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interbranch contracts, it is unclear how the extra time would help. If
what is needed is information on how nonfinancial sector taxpayers
use interbranch contracts, then more data on financial taxpayers is not
particularly useful. If the limited recognition rule is valued for its risk
containment, however, then it could be a sensible interim step if APAs
are providing the Service with sufficiently comprehensive data on the
general use of interbranch contracts.
To the extent the major hesitation in recognizing interbranch
contracts derives from a concern about abuse, it is useful to consider
what the sources of such abuse might be. Potential pricing and timing
games would necessitate rules paralleling the related party provisions
(§§ 267 and 482 of the LR.C.). Such branch anti-abuse rules would
face the same design and administrability questions that challenge
§§ 267 and 482. Assuming, however, that comparable results can be
achieved from these anti-abuse rules in the branch context, the re-
maining risks lie beyond simple timing and income location maneu-
vers.246 Risk possibilities may develop in the interaction of specific rules
that classify income and assign importance to that classification. Other
opportunities for abuse may derive from the interaction of tax and
regulatory law. Many of the same risks exist in related party transac-
tions, and the Service's experiences there, as well as in the APA treat-
ment of branch transactions, should provide an adequate foundation
for recognition of interbranch transactions without risking wholesale
abuse.
A related issue, which does not involve abuse per se, raises ques-
tions about the Service's capacity to monitor taxpayer transactions.
The issue is the coexistence of two different kinds of transfers between
the relevant parties, either subsidiary and parent or branch and home
office. The first kind of transfer is the arm's length transaction, such
as a swap, that has been the focus of this paper. This transaction's
recognition and taxation is important to a more sensible allocation and
calculation of taxable income. The second is a special relationship
transaction that depends on the shareholder or branch status. Exam-
ples include contributions to the capital of the corporation or transfers
from the home office to the branch as funding capital.
Distinguishing between the two categories depends on a variety of
factors such as the nature of the transfer, reciprocity, reporting in the
books and records, contemporaneous identification, and whether the
transaction is of a type entered into with third parties. Again, the
241  See supra text accompanying notes 58-188.
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experience with both related party transactions and APA branch cases
makes the foray into these distinctions less novel in the interbranch
context. Nonetheless, concern about abuse is not unwarranted and
parallels to related party transactions may not be entirely satisfactory,
especially if the difference in legal status between branches and sub-
sidiaries affords branches greater opportunities for strategic behavior.
The choice of rule for interbranch contracts depends in part on an
assessment of the similarity of interbranch and related party transac-
tions, the degree of risk under different regimes, and the value of data
collected on both related party contracts and APA treatment of inter-
branch contracts.
E. Interbranch Election
Another statutory option for recognizing interbranch contracts
would be to establish an election for interbranch treatment. The ques-
tion here would be what benefits derive from making the tax treatment
elective. First, the elective approach may be preferable because if it
leads a few, but not too many, nonfinancial sector entities to pursue
recognition, the Service would have the opportunity to expand its
understanding of interbranch contracts.
Second, depending on how broadly interbranch transactions are
defined, some taxpayers might prefer nonrecognition of interbranch
transactions. Taxpayers who perceive themselves to be operating as
single entities and for whom interbranch transfers do not play a sig-
nificant role in the calculation of branch taxable income might find it
inconvenient to keep track of interbranch transactions (as well as to
monitor them for arm's length pricing). This scenario is most probable
where the interbranch transactions are not of the type normally en-
tered into by the taxpayer with third parties. For such taxpayers, an
election into (or out of) interbranch recognition may permit the
flexibility needed to accommodate the impact of legal status, legal
distinctions, and economic ownership. This rationale for an election
was the premise underlying the new consolidated group hedging rules
which allow either single or separate entity treatment of the group. 247
Here, however, as in the consolidated case, there remains the
question of whether an election should be on an entity or a transaction
basis. If there are some interbranch contracts which are not in the
special relationship category (of, for example, a contribution to capi-
tal), but also do not need to be recognized for sensible taxation, then
147 Se? SUPI text accompanying notes 141-50.
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the flexibility of an election may be useful. On the other hand, an
election may increase the government's monitoring costs as well as the
opportunity for abuse. Under those circumstances, the practical re-
sponse and compromise might be to grant the election only on an
entity basis.
Despite the analysis above, the value of an election is questionable
on several grounds. First, if the election is entity-wide, so that the real
choice is between subsidiary-like treatment of interbranch transactions
and traditional nonrecognition, that choice is de facto available on an
elective basis to the taxpayer through the decision to operate through
a branch or through a subsidiary. If the choice is already available
through the incorporation decision (or through an election under the
new classification rules), an additional opportunity for choice may be
an unwarranted complication of the system. 248 However, placing the
entire burden of resolving internal risk-shifting problems on the choice
to incorporate fails to account for the multifaceted nature of the
decision to incorporate. For example, as described earlier, financial
institutions have powerful operating and regulatory incentives to use
the branch form. Even if incorporation of the branch resulted in tax
treatment more reflective of the underlying transactions, incorpora-
tion might carry too great a regulatory burden. A tax election would
accommodate these factors.
The practical value of an election is also questioned by a compari-
son with the limited recognition rule. Given that most financial entities
likely would make an election, and that many other entities might
not (because the record keeping requirements might outweigh the
benefit), it is not clear that the results under an election rule would
vary from the third approach (limited recognition). If that prediction
is accurate, the choice between an election approach and a limited
recognition rule turns on an assessment of the costs of each method.
Limited recognition would increase debate over which entities qualify
for recognition. An election procedure would raise questions about
effective elections; in addition, it would broaden the range of taxpayers
potentially choosing interbranch recognition to beyond those with
which the Service has had experience through the APA process. These
costs must be compared with the possible benefits including flexibility,
limited risk for the government, and the opportunity to gather infor-
mation.
2 ' 18 See supra text accompanying notes 121 -22.
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F. Treaty Recognition of Interbranch Contracts
A final, non-statutory approach to recognizing interbranch con-
tracts would be to recognize them only through treaties. In this con-
text, treaty-based recognition means drafting a treaty article that grants
recognition of interbranch contracts to taxpayers entitled to the benefits
of the treaty. Unlike the current APA process which relies on the treaty
mutual agreement provision and which requires government negotia-
tion on a case-by-case basis, a specific treaty article would enable tax-
payers to avail themselves of branch recognition by direct. reference to
the terms of the treaty.
A specific treaty article could be preferable to the statutory alter-
natives outlined above. Both enable the taxpayer to recognize inter-
branch contracts for tax purposes without further government involve-
ment; no permission or negotiating is required. However, the United
States may gain a strategic negotiating advantage by inserting an inter-
branch contract provision into a treaty instead of into a statute. A
branch rule drafted as a statute or a regulation is a unilateral act. The
benefits are available to taxpayers from all countries without any con-
cessions having been secured in return. In contrast, if the branch rule
is part of treaty drafting, then the United States can use it in the
bargaining process to extract a favorable provision for U.S. residents.'"
In addition to enhancing the U.S. negotiating position, use of a
treaty provision may limit the number but not necessarily the range of
taxpayers having their branch transactions recognized. Thus, the Serv-
ice could have exposure to a variety of interbranch contracts without
the administrative burden and risk of a broad statutory recognition
rule. Even if the United States later enacted a statutory rule allowing
recognition of interbranch contracts, taking the initial steps through
the treaty process would give the Service a buffer period to gather
information. During the time that interbranch contracts are recog-
nized only by treaty, however, recognition is limited to those transac-
tions involving a treaty country. This is the same situation currently
facing taxpayers under the APA process. 25° Interbranch contracts are
recognized only through the mutual agreement provision. Thus, an
applicable treaty is necessary to get the Service to recognize the con-
tract. A comparable transaction undertaken in a non-treaty country
will not he recognized by the Service.
21 " See .sufrra text accompanying note 239.
2" See supra text accompanying notes 235-37.
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A more serious problem with the treaty approach is a practical
one. Treaty negotiation can be a slow and complicated process. The
APA reliance on treaties' mutual agreement provisions was imple-
mented immediately because it involved interpretation of an existing
article. However, reliance on a new interbranch provision would have
to await the actual negotiation and approval of new treaties. Although
once the provision was in place a taxpayer could more easily obtain
benefits through a treaty interbranch article than through an APA, the
mutual agreement provision underlying the APAs is available now.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, resolving significant issues of branch
taxation through a bilateral or multilateral process, rather than through
a unilateral statutory change, may make the availability of the remedy
too uncertain.
G. Summary
The recommendations outlined above do not include an appor-
tionment formula for several reasons. First, a formulary approach is
excluded (except to the extent some version is used in an APA) be-
cause an arm's length method should be fairly successful with the
transactions under review—interbranch contracts that are comparable
to third-party contracts, and are often financial ones for which market
quotes should be readily available. Second, avoidance of double taxa-
tion under a formulary approach may be more difficult because other
countries have significantly differing ideas of what constitutes the cor-
rect formula."' Finally, most countries have given a cool reception to
the suggestion of adopting a formulary approach in place of an arm's
length standard. 252 California's experience with the unitary method
251 See, e.g., Plambeck, supra note 15, at 1156 (noting the difficulties in "reaching agreements
as to the apportionment factors").
252
 The 1996 WA Congress, in considering the taxation of permanent establishments of
banks, insurance companies, and other financial services entities, which "are often subject to high
levels of regulation that conflict with tax law," endorsed the direct method for allocation of
income and capital based on branch accounts and rejected the indirect (formulary) method.
Albertina M. Fernandez, 50th g'A Congress Gets Underway in Geneva, 13 TAX NOTES iNVL 860
(Sept. 9, 1996). The resolution adopted by the Congress states:
Allowing for the extended functional independence of permanent establishments
of banks and insurance companies, the capital endowment of the branch in accord-
ance with the regulatory requirements has to be respected by the relevant tax
authorities, Any exceeding amount should be respected as a loan granted by the
head office to the branch 'or' additional equity depending on the head office's
valid commercial intention, since it must be at the head office's entrepreneurial
discretion to vest the branch with any amount considered necessary to conduct the
branch-specific business line.
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demonstrated the international controversy that a formulary approach
can generate.2"
Therefore, in considering the future direction of branch taxation,
the six alternatives outlined above capture the spectrum of choices that
are likely available. These six rules do not exhaust the possibilities, and
in fact it is easy to envision rules that combine attributes of two or
more, such as an interbranch election for financial entities, or a short-
form APA for interbranch contracts of financial entities. In focusing
on the basic six possibilities, however, preference for a given rule
depends on the analysis and relative weight of certain factors.
The factors driving the choice can be grouped into two basic
categories: those that emphasize the impact of the rules on taxpayers
and those that emphasize the administrative concerns of the Service.
In the first category, the factors include: (1) concern for nonfinancial
entities' interbranch contracts; (2) need for more widely and immedi-
ately available relief; and (3) flexibility for taxpayers in different factual
circumstances. If few nonfinancial entities have a serious interbranch
problem, then a limited recognition rule may be acceptable. Con-
versely, if expanding taxpayer access to interbranch recognition is
critical, the general recognition or election approach would be prefer-
able. If the key is time, a treaty or APA approach would be unattractive
because of the delay under each. 254
 Instead, any of the other four
approaches would be better in terms of their immediate availability,
although the scope of coverage of taxpayers and transactions would
vary. If flexibility is sought for taxpayers, an election would be more
desirable than a single statutory rule (e.g., tracing, limited recognition,
and full recognition) and an APA or treaty approach might be an
adequate alternative.
In the second category, which focuses on administrative concerns,
the factors include: (1) need for more data on financial entities; (2)
need for more data on nonfinancial entities; (3) likely sources of more
Id. The Congress also encouraged revision of the OECD guidelines for allocating income from
loans: "Allowing for the functional independence of the branches of banks and insurance
companies, the transferability of loans should be recognized for taxation purposes if valid com-
mercial reasons can he given for such transferor' if the same transfer would have been effected
between unrelated third parties." Id.
2" See, e.g., J. Dwight Evans, With Barclays and Colgate Settled, Worldwide Formulary Reporting
Goes Federal, 94 'Fax Norm Timm' 200-118 (Oct. 21, 1994) (noting the concern of the United
Kingdom and numerous other lbreign governments over California's use of worldwide appor-
tionment); Samuels & Brown, supra note 7, at 600 (describing some difficulties California
encountered with its unitary tax).
254
 For APAs the time consuming element is the individual negotiation process (which can
take time and money); For treaties, it is the country-level negotiation.
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information; (4) value of increased treaty bargaining power; (5) pres-
ervation of government's future flexibility; (6) risk of abuse from too
many taxpayers using interbranch contracts; (7) risk of abuse from
nonfinancial entities using interbranch contracts; and (8) nature of
information obtained from the APA process.
If more data is needed on financial entities' use of interbranch
contracts, then a conservative approach, either the continued APA
approach or a limited recognition rule, might meet this need by
restricting the taxpayers for whom interbranch recognition would be
available until the Service had the opportunity to gather adequate data.
Alternatively, if the information needed concerns how nonfinancial
entities use interbranch contracts, then the limited recognition rule
would be ineffectual because it would only allow financial entities to
have recognized interbranch contracts. An APA approach might be
useful if nonfinancial taxpayers are using the process for their inter-
branch contracts.
In all of these considerations, potential sources of new informa-
tion are central. If APAs are a valuable resource, continuation or even
expansion of the program may be warranted. If new information is
more likely to emerge from statutory changes, then that direction
should be considered. Of course, if a statutory approach is unappeal-
ing for its unilateral nature, then a treaty approach would allow the
United States to derive an additional benefit from a change in position.
The slow pace of the treaty process also would provide more opportu-
nity for the United States to modify its view of branch taxation, al-
though it would not offer as much flexibility for the government as the
APA process.
The risk of abuse certainly weighs heavily in the government's
analysis of the alternatives. However, specificity about the abuses envi-
sioned can help direct the choice of approach. If the risk of abuse
derives from too many taxpayers using interbranch contracts (at least
initially), then a general recognition rule would be undesirable and a
more restrictive approach might be preferred if it reduced the volume
of taxpayers with recognized interbranch contracts. 255
 If instead, the
risk of abuse derives from nonfinancial entities using interbranch con-
tracts (because the Service lacks information about their use), then a
method that both limited the access of nonfinancial entities to recog-
255 The approach could be restrictive by type of business (through, for example, the limited
recognition rule), by country (through the treaty process), or by design (through the APA
process).
J uly 1997 j	 RISK-SHIFTING	 735
nition of interbranch contracts while permitting the gathering of data
about. nonfinancial entities' use of the contracts would be appropriate.
In sifting through these Factors and possible approaches it is clear
that all of the factors are relevant. The question is how they should be
weighted, which in turns depends on information about taxpayer be-
havior, much of which is directly or indirectly available through the
APA process and thus is in the domain of the Service. The best rule is
the one that most successfully integrates the impact of legal status, legal
distinctions, and economic ownership, while being simultaneously sen-
sitive to administrative concerns of the Service.
Based on information currently available, the limited recognition
rule appears to be the most viable approach. It offers recourse for the
taxpayers most likely to stiffer from whipsaws and unpredictable taxa-
tion under the current rules governing risk-shifting within a single
corporation. It also enables the United States to confront the problem
in a way that harmonizes its treatment with that of many OECD coun-
tries. Moreover, the scope of a limited recognition rule incorporates
the Service's concerns regarding abuse and administrability. If an APA
program were simultaneously operated, it could serve as a complemen-
tary tool in the development of the tax law by continuing to gather
information while serving as an outlet for taxpayers not covered by the
statutory provision. In the future, the balance of taxpayer needs and
administrative concerns might permit adoption of a more comprehen-
sive approach.
CONCLUSION
The current U.S. approach to the taxation of risk-shifting within
a single multinational corporation presents a serious obstacle to the
growing international financial markets. Not only are the U.S. rules
arbitrary and internally inconsistent, they are also in direct conflict
with those of most other major industrialized nations. The United
States developed these rules based on an incomplete understanding of
contractual risk-shifting. In evaluating risk-shifting transactions, the
United States has primarily focused on legal status. The government
has relied on a party's status as a legally independent entity to treat it
as a separate taxpayer and thus recognize its transactions. Unfortu-
nately, the legal status analysis fails to incorporate the two other factors,
economic ownership and legal distinctions, that are critical to design-
ing a tax treatment consistent with the underlying economic transac-
tions.
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There are, however, several alternative methods for taxing risk-
shifting within a corporation, all of which more successfully integrate
the impact of legal status, legal distinctions, and economic ownership.
As a result, a move to one of these regimes would offer more sensible
taxation of cross-border risk-shifting without compromising the United
States' administrative goals. Moreover, the choice among the alterna-
tives could be based on the government's assessment of each plan's
respective implementation trajectory. Ultimately, the issues raised by
the risk-shifting transactions not only reveal the complex interaction
of economic ownership and taxable units, but also highlight the need
for critical examination of these core concepts in the tax system.
